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A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE USE OF THE
COMMISSIONED PUBLIC REPORT AS AN
EFFECTIVE CRISIS-MANAGEMENT TOOL
F. JOSEPH WARIN,* OLEH VRETSONA** & LORA E. MACDONALD†

ABSTRACT
When terrorists attack an energy installation, disaster strikes a nuclear
power plant, or a hurricane tears through wide swathes of a city, immediate concern is for the persons affected by the disaster. Close on the heels of
this concern is often criticism of how the organization responsible for those
persons’ safety has handled the catastrophic event, and an inept
response—or one perceived as inept—can spell the organization’s demise.
Institutional cracks are laid bare for the world to see, the public narrative
turns it from victim to villain, reputational damage mounts, and a wave
of public scrutiny and litigation looms.
If prepared properly and timely, a commissioned public report on the
handling of a crisis can be an enormously powerful tool not only to manage the blowback from disaster, but also to enhance organizational reputation and generate positive public sentiment by evaluating institutional
crisis-management capabilities and taking proactive steps to address any
shortcomings without substantially damaging the organization’s legal
positioning.
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Though scholars have discussed the promise of the effectively commissioned public report, they have yet to provide a comprehensive guide to its
creation. This Article, written by practitioners, provides such guidance
from a more pragmatic perspective. We explain that an effective public
post-crisis report must have an eye on the three crises that are inherent in
every disaster: the institutional crisis, the legal crisis, and the public relations crisis. We emphasize that to the extent that these crises are in tension,
reports should primarily focus upon improving the institution, rather than
upon waging a public relations campaign or upon avoiding potential legal
liability at all costs. Of course, we recognize that in each specific situation,
organizations’ internal and external advisers will guide their clients on the
appropriate balance among these three important considerations.
Drawing upon a diverse set of commissioned public reports, we provide a framework for structuring such reports to achieve multi-dimensional
goals. An effective report begins with a well-composed commission and a
well-run investigation. The report itself should provide a definitive narrative of the events, identify organizational capabilities and potential shortcomings, and provide recommendations that will address the identified
shortcomings. This Article addresses each of these issues, concluding with
a set of recommendations, drawn from professional experience and the collective wisdom of various post-crisis reports, for improving organizational
capabilities before the next crisis hits.
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On January 16, 2013, terrorists with ties to al-Qaeda attacked the
Tigantourine natural gas facility near In Amenas, Algeria, with over 800
people inside. After taking over the facility, the terrorists searched for
expatriate workers, who, they announced, would be put inside the plant
before it was blown up. Although the Algerian army was ultimately able
to prevent the terrorists from achieving their grisly goal, at least 39 foreigners and an Algerian security guard were killed in the four-day siege,
as were 29 militants.
The Tigantourine installation is a joint venture between the Norwegian majority-state-owned Statoil,1 the U.K. multinational BP, and
Sonatrach, the Algerian state oil company. Five Statoil employees were
killed in the attack, and four BP employees. Following the terrorist
attack, Statoil decided to commission an independent report to investigate the incident. The report was pursued to address the serious security threats that are inherent in conducting operations in similar
politically-unstable areas;2 its stated objectives were “to clarify the chain
of events and to facilitate learning and further improvements within
1. One of the co-authors of this Article, F. Joseph Warin, served as compliance monitor for Statoil from 2006 to November 2009 in a monitorship arising out of a resolution
with the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.
2. See, e.g., Francis Ghilès, Algerian Gas’ Challenges After the Attack on In Amenas, 70
NOTES INTERNACIONALS CIDOB 1 (2013), available at http://www.cidob.org/es/publica
ciones/notes_internacionals/n1_70/algerian_gas_challenges_after_the_attack_on_in_
amenas.
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risk assessment, security, and emergency preparedness.”3 Notably, the
report was initiated proactively by Statoil, and was not created reactively
in response to a governmental or other external command.
The investigation that formed the basis of the Statoil report was
conducted by prominent outside experts and was released on September 12, 2013, approximately eight months following the attack.4 The
decision to commission the report—which entailed a significant assignment of control over the message to an outside entity—reflected a
belief that doing so would be the best way to manage what was a significant crisis for Statoil. This was perceived as an effective response for
Statoil as an institution that relies on production in highly unstable
areas, and as a public company whose success depends on maintaining
a good reputation in the eyes of investors, politicians, and the public at
large. In many respects, Statoil is unique because the government of
Norway (through the Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy)
owns 67% of the company.5
The Statoil report is notable in many ways, not least for the dramatic events that prompted its creation, and because commissioned
public reports are becoming more frequently utilized as an effective
tool to manage and shape the narratives that follow crises. Although
the commission of public reports has historically been primarily a government practice,6 other public institutions are growing increasingly
familiar with their use.7 Commercial entities, too, are finding commissioned public reports highly suitable to address the various crises they
encounter. Statoil’s response to the In Amenas incident is especially
probative of this trend, but the examples of Enron, GM, and others are
also indicative of the wide range of contexts in which companies perceive the use of a commissioned public report as an effective response.

3. STATOIL, THE IN AMENAS ATTACK: REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE TERATTACK ON IN AMENAS (2013), available at http://www.statoil.com/en/NewsAndMedia/News/2013/Pages/12Sep_InAmenas_report.aspx [hereinafter IN AMENAS
REPORT].
4. Id.
5. See Top 20 Shareholders, STATOIL, http://www.statoil.com/en/investorcentre/
share/shareholders/top20/pages/default.aspx (last updated Feb. 2, 2014, 11:56 AM) (as
of Dec. 31, 2013).
6. See, e.g., WARREN COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON THE
ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY (1964) [hereinafter WARREN COMMISSION REPORT];
Steven R. Ross et al., The Rise and Permanence of Quasi-Legislative Independent Commissions, 27
J.L. & POL. 415 (2012) (discussing progression of government commissions from executive commissions to legislative commissions, beginning with the Roberts report, to quasilegislative independent commissions, such as the 9/11 Report). The United States government has long commissioned public reports, though the form’s prominence—the rise
of the high-anticipated public report—truly began with the Congressionally-commissioned response to Pearl Harbor. See Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Investigation
of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 79th Cong. (1946) [hereinafter Roberts Commission Report].
7. See infra note 43 for the response of Pennsylvania State University to a sexual
abuse scandal.
RORIST
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A. Public Reports and Crisis Management: The Three Crises
To understand the value of a commissioned public report, it is necessary to understand what it is, and why its unique characteristics make
it more suited in many situations to the task of crisis management than
other forms. What makes this type of report a more powerful response
in certain circumstances than, for example, an internal investigation
and subsequent internal report without further public review? What
role should it occupy among the tools available to companies in crisis
situations? The first step in analyzing the benefits promised by an effective commissioned public report is to understand the evolution of a crisis and its management.
For every catastrophe confronting an organization, there are three
primary crises: an institutional crisis, a public relations crisis, and a
legal crisis. Though the traditional and instinctive reactions to these
crises are in tension, a correctly deployed commissioned public report
has significant potential to mitigate or resolve that tension. This Article
seeks to provide a template for a report meeting these objectives.
1. What Is a Crisis?
At its most basic, a crisis is “a time of intense difficulty, trouble, or
danger; a time when a difficult or important decision must be made.”8
The crisis management academy defines crisis more specifically, as “an
unpredictable, major threat that can have a negative effect on the
organization, industry, or stakeholders if handled improperly.”9 By its
terms, this definition broadly encompasses all types of crises, whether
natural or man-made. The scope of this Article is far narrower, and will
focus on how to manage the response to crises that arise as a result of
intentional human actions or human negligence.
It is useful to view a crisis as being composed of two chronological
parts: the actual event, itself a “time of intense difficulty, trouble, or
danger,” and the shadow-crisis that threatens to occur subsequent to
the event. Failure to appropriately handle a crisis in the first instance
has the potential to plunge the entity perceived as responsible for such
failure into a deeper, and potentially worse, state of crisis. Whereas an
entity may not be blamed for the direct consequences of a crisis caused
by actions and intentions external to it, it will be held responsible for
the quality of its response. For example, a terrorist organization will be
considered culpable for deaths resulting from an attack perpetrated by
its members; the corporation operating the facility subject to terrorist
attack likely will not be blamed for the attack and its consequences.
Nevertheless, that corporation may be blamed for any perceived failure
to respond effectively to the crisis in its immediate aftermath and in the
weeks and months ahead. It may also be condemned for a failure to
implement the lessons learned from previous crises. The immediate
8. THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 401 (2d ed. 2005).
9. W. TIMOTHY COOMBS, CODE RED IN THE BOARDROOM: CRISIS MANAGEMENT
ORGANIZATIONAL DNA 2 (2006) (emphasis added).

AS
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event that manifests the initial “crisis” is often indistinguishable from
the follow-up threat of the shadow crisis, and they are together best
understood to form the institutional, public relations, and legal crises
mentioned earlier. These “three crises” will be explored in greater
detail below.
2. The Institutional Crisis
The institutional crisis is that directly resulting from the disastrous
event. This is the immediate impact, both in terms of actual, tangible
damage and the revelation of the organization’s potential shortcomings
flowing from the fact that the damage occurred at all. For Statoil, then,
the institutional crisis created by the terrorist assault was the present
threat to the safety of its field workers and northern African operations.
It was also its lost profit during the period of the attack on and rehabilitation of its facility, and the stakeholder confidence in the viability and
security of the operation.
On September 11, 2001, the United States lost its sense of security
when the national intelligence system failed to prevent hijacked planes
from crashing into buildings in downtown New York City. Apart from
the tangible damage, the attack created an institutional crisis by
revealing potential vulnerabilities in existing intelligence networks.
The scandal at Pennsylvania State University threw its sports program
into crisis not only by uncovering the ongoing sex abuse within its walls,
but also by suggesting that the football program might harbor a child
molester or other illegal activity. By revealing previously-unknown or
unconsidered institutional issues, a crisis can affect both those within it
and those external to it.
3. The Public Relations Crisis
The public relations crisis is perhaps the aspect of crisis with which
we are all most familiar because it can directly harm the institution’s
reputation. For Statoil, it was the implication that the company might
not be able to maintain the safety of its operations in politically troubled areas (an implication which, for a company with global operations,
had the potential for worldwide impact). This suggestion had significant power to endanger the company’s continued profitability, and
even its institutional integrity. In the case of September 11th, the institutional crisis of a major terrorist attack led to a subsequent public relations crisis as between the government and its citizens. Previous
confidence—or perhaps, complacent belief—in the robustness of the
national security program was rocked by a confirmed fear that our intelligence system might be incapable of recognizing and protecting us
from external threats. The occurrence of this terrorist attack opened
us wide to the reality of the threat of future ones. It forced us to ask
certain difficult questions, and the compromised institution to answer
them, including: Do we and/or should we, trust our government to protect us from external threat?
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The public relations crisis carries with it a question of blame. Who
should we blame for the events that occurred; is the affected institution
victim or villain? Do we sympathize with the football program whose
wholesome aspect has been compromised by infiltration by a child
molester, or do we fault it for providing him with a safe harbor? Do we
feel for the Department of State’s losses in Benghazi or do we rather ask
how it could have allowed such a thing to occur?10 Although the public
relations crisis often takes center stage, particularly in post-crisis public
reports, this Article perceives a far larger role for such reports. True,
the public relations crisis is the most obvious, but it is not the most
important—a more holistic approach, one that both acknowledges and
addresses the three primary crises inherent in a catastrophic event, is a
far more worthwhile endeavor.11
4. The Legal Crisis
Crisis management experts and lawyers do not work together
closely enough. Few crisis management texts are written by lawyers,
and thus few can give real attention to the legal consequences of catastrophe. In addressing the legal crisis, this paper attempts to start to
build a bridge over that gap.
Disasters are sparks for litigation. This is a simple fact: if your institution becomes embroiled in crisis, it will almost certainly find itself
defending against lawsuits. Recent examples lend credence to this
truth for instance, Penn State has been sued dozens of times over the
Sandusky scandal,12 and litigation against a myriad of airlines and other
commercial defendants spawning from 9/11 is still ongoing.13 Corporate crises are also notorious for creating lawsuits; the securities litigation stemming from the Enron scandal is a prime example.14
When deciding whether, and how, to address the crisis with a commissioned public report, it is crucial to consider the impact of such a
report on pending or threatened litigation. Will the report impact such
litigation in a negative or positive way, or will it have no effect? What
implications does the publication of such a report have on an organization’s long-term legal outlook?
10. See IAN I. MITROFF & GUS ANAGNOS, MANAGING CRISES BEFORE THEY HAPPEN:
WHAT EVERY EXECUTIVE AND MANAGER NEEDS TO KNOW ABOUT CRISIS MANAGEMENT 20
(2001) (“[A]s many organizations have sadly found out, it is not only comparatively easy
to handle a situation when one is the victim, but it is also extremely easy to go quickly
from being a victim to being a villain.”).
11. See, e.g., R. William Ide III & Douglas H. Yarn, Public Independent Fact-Finding: A
Trust-Generating Institution for an Age of Corporate Illegitimacy and Public Mistrust, 56 VAND. L.
REV. 1113, 1147 (2003) (discussing the role of public independent fact finding in regaining public trust).
12. See Andrew Zajac, Penn State Settles First of Sandusky Sex Abuse Lawsuits, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 18, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-18/penn-state-settlesfirst-of-sandusky-sex-abuse-lawsuits.html.
13. See generally In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 714 F.3d 659 (2d Cir.
2013).
14. See In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 258 F. Supp. 2d 576 (S.D.
Tex. 2003).
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5. Tension Between the Three Crises
One of the most difficult truths one must confront in making the
decision whether or not to address a particular crisis via a commissioned public report is that an ineffective or poorly-executed report
may mitigate one crisis while exacerbating another. It is natural for
certain stakeholders to privilege the resolution of one crisis over
another as per their individual priorities or experience, but doing so
may only worsen the institution’s preexisting problem. In order to create an effective report, all three crises must be addressed; the tension
between them must be assuaged by ensuring that the importance of
each is recognized by those with influence over the institutional
response.
The decision to respond to a crisis with a commissioned public
report necessitates agreement among those at the institution who are
responsible for managing operational, public relations, and legal issues.
It is crucial that each of these sectors agree not only to include a commissioned public report in their response, but also that the report adequately addresses each of the three crises. This consensus is often
difficult to achieve. Norman Augustine wryly observed that:
Crisis situations tend to be accompanied by conflicting advice—
with the legal department warning, “Tell ‘em nothing and tell ‘em
slow,” the public relations department appealing for an immediate press conference, the shareholder relations department terrified of doing anything, and the engineers all wanting to disappear
into their labs for a few years to conduct confirmatory
experiments.15

Carefully addressing all three fronts is critical to a successful organizational response, as may be illustrated by GM’s handling of the
recent recall crisis. A mid-level engineer in charge of the ignition
switch on certain GM vehicles allegedly approved a sub-standard switch
and then quietly replaced it without disclosing the change after the
company received complaints from customers and other engineers.
The potentially defective ignition switches installed in the vehicles led
to GM recalling over 15 million cars. The company hired former U.S.
Attorney Anton Valukas, of law firm Jenner & Block, LLP, to evaluate
the reasons for the company’s failure to notice and fix the defect. The
report, which was made public in June 2014, “led to the dismissal of 15
GM employees, including a vice president for regulatory affairs and a
senior lawyer responsible for product liability cases, and forced broad
changes in how the company handles vehicle safety.”16 The report
found no evidence of deliberate wrongdoing, nor of an upper-level
cover-up.
15. Norman R. Augustine, Managing the Crisis You Tried To Prevent, 73 HARV. BUS.
REV. 6, 21 (1995), available at https://hbr.org/1995/11/managing-the-crisis-you-tried-toprevent.
16. Bill Vlasic, G.M. Inquiry Cites Years of Neglect Over Fatal Defect, N.Y. TIMES (June 5,
2014), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/06/business/gm-ignition-switchinternal-recall-investigation-report.html.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\29-1\NDE103.txt

2015]

unknown

Seq: 9

20-APR-15

COMMISSIONED PUBLIC REPORT AS CRISIS-MANAGEMENT TOOL

10:11

95

Perhaps the most common iteration of an asymmetrical approach
to addressing the three main elements of a crisis is the oft-occurring
failure of an organization to address its public relations crisis due to
legal concerns. Managing a public relations crisis requires that the
organization make a meaningful statement about what has occurred,
which often necessitates conceding that a crisis has in fact occurred.
Legal counsel often express fears that such concessions could be perceived as liability-inducing apology or other fodder for follow-up litigation. As Keith Michael Hearit articulates it, “some companies choose
not to take a public relations stance to the charges of criticism due to
the fact that significant legal issues inhere in the criticism—and thus
avoid participating in the public drama that surrounds the allegations
of their wrongdoing.”17 Nevertheless, it is unlikely that failure to participate in the public dialogue that follows a crisis will give the affected
organization the absolution it seeks—rather, the public may view
silence as an indication of guilt. Moreover, where an organization does
focus on its PR crisis, or its legal crisis, or both, but does not address the
institutional issues, it is far more likely than not that the actual crisis will
never be resolved.
In discussing what makes an effective commissioned public report,
this Article canvasses a number of such reports. Our criticism of many
is that, while they acknowledge the concerns of the public or their own
legal exposure, they do little to improve institutional capacities.18 The
academic literature has likewise shortchanged the extent to which crisis
response should, first and foremost, improve organizational prevention
and response systems.19 It is our position that a well-run investigation
and a well-written public report can help resolve the three crises, so that
the institutional and public relations crises are addressed while the
legal crisis is not exacerbated. To that end, such a report must be written with an eye on all three crises. This paper aims to set out how to
achieve this.20
B. Purpose of Article
This Article aspires to be a resource for organizations considering
the use of a commissioned public report in their crisis management
response. It aims to provide a comprehensive framework for creating
effective public post-crisis reports that respond to the institutional,
legal, and public relations crises that every organization faces in the
wake of catastrophe.
17. KEITH MICHAEL HEARIT, CRISIS MANAGEMENT BY APOLOGY: CORPORATE RESPONSES
ALLEGATIONS OF WRONGDOING 17 (2006).
18. See infra Parts II.A, III.B.6.
19. See, e.g., Ide & Yarn, supra note 11, at 1147.
20. See Edwin G. Schallert & Natalie R. Williams, Report of the Investigation, in INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS 301, 302 (Barry F. McNeil & Brad D. Brian eds., 2007)
(discussing benefits and risks of the internal investigative report, including the present
facts and aid in management decision-making, aid in litigation with government); Ide &
Yarn, supra note 11, at 1146–47, 1153 (discussing role of public fact-finding in rebuilding
trust and social legitimacy after a crisis).
TO
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This Article also emphasizes the importance of an appropriate
investigation strategy as a necessary prerequisite to the creation of an
effective commissioned public report. As attorneys focused on defending corporations in legal crisis, we know that it is essential to get to the
bottom of potential wrongdoing in order to minimize legal and reputational damage. Any lawyer knows that it is impossible to help a client
before first knowing the facts.21 Accordingly, this Article seeks to
underscore the way in which organizations can take advantage of the
forced self-reflection inherent in crisis management to make themselves stronger and more sustainable not only in the immediate aftermath of a crisis, but also with regard to long-term institutional integrity.
Self-reflection is a valuable skill for organizations facing a wide
range of legal issues. Self-reporting in the wake of a crisis can engender
goodwill and credibility among the public audience.22 Even in civil litigation following a crisis, the extent to which an organization has visibly
sought to discover facts and make amends can be beneficial, if for no
other reason than its potential to change the dialogue. Seeing an
organization take responsibility for the aspects of its structure that may
have contributed to or enabled a crisis to occur is likely to endow with
greater credibility its asserted willingness to change to prevent future
crises. In turn, this self-reflection strengthens the organization against
future crisis. In responding to crises, however, it is of course necessary
that a company first discover the extent of the wrongdoing or institu-

21. Neil Hodge, In Case of Emergency, 7 IN-HOUSE PERSP. 23, 27 (2011) (“Lawyers
need to be proactive: they need to understand what has happened, what caused it and
what is going to be done.”). This point is a key one. If one does not acknowledge the
need to deal with the realities that the organization faces at the outset of a crisis, any
strategy to address or remediate the issue will be short-sighted and ineffective. It is important to acknowledge at the outset that the facts are the facts and that the facts cannot be
changed (i.e., it is important to accept the facts). It is also important to be as transparent
as is reasonably possible regarding the facts (as it is much better that they are identified
by the organization than by another, external, source which is not vigilant to organizational interests).
22. As we often counsel clients on the complex analysis required to determine
whether or not to voluntarily disclose potential misconduct, we would be remiss in failing
to note something of that highly nuanced calculus here, and to make a further note on
this Article’s scope. We deal here with crises of the sort which are by their nature inevitably public—the stuff of headlines. The commissioned public reports of which we speak,
then, are a public response to public catastrophe. Though the decision would necessarily
be fact-dependent, it may not be advisable to commission a public report on events that
are not yet public. When the events are public, the circumstances may swing the pendulum in the direction of commissioning a public report and there is little opportunity to
maintain ownership of the decision to disclose their occurrence. When the crisis is not
public—the events of the disaster are not already known to the outside world—there are
strong legal considerations which may advise against publication and disclosure. In such
a situation, based on appropriate legal advice, it is likely better to protect confidentiality
and remediate internally than it would be to enlist a public commission to investigate.
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tional deficiency and then consult with counsel23 to determine the correct course of action.24
II. THE PUBLIC POST-CRISIS REPORT: AN OVERVIEW
Even a cursory review of historical crises reveals that organizations
have frequently addressed them by conducting internal investigations
and issuing internal investigation reports. Although these reports are
undoubtedly instrumental in determining the extent of an organization’s legal liability, they may be insufficient to address a public relations crisis and, without more, to respond to the institutional crisis.
Similarly, compelled reports, such as those generated in the course of
an FCPA monitorship,25 may address the institutional crisis, but are
unlikely to serve as an effective public relations tool. In contrast, historical experience reveals that the voluntarily-commissioned public reports
that are the subject of this Article may in some situations be crucial to
the resolution of the public relations crisis and trigger the necessary
institutional change.
A. From Pearl Harbor to Private Initiative: A Brief History of the Use of the
Public Commissioned Report
The United States government has long commissioned independent public reports. Indeed, their use dates back to the nation’s founding. Both executive and legislative commissions have long been a part
of government practice to manage the political milieu. Lance Cole
writes of executive reports that:
They have been used in this country since President George Washington sent a special commission of three members to investigate
the Whiskey Rebellion in western Pennsylvania, and Washington’s
use of a special commission was probably inspired by the longstanding practice in England of employing royal commissions to
address national problems. Since Washington’s presidency, the
use of special commissions has waxed and waned; their use was
limited in the nineteenth century and steadily increased beginning with the Administration of President Theodore Roosevelt
and continuing throughout the twentieth century. Special commissions are now a fixture of our national government, and some
23. We should stress that it is also very important that the organization work with
counsel who have a deep understanding of the organizational culture, and that counsel
and management work together to develop a sound approach to the crisis response with
which both are comfortable. Without a relationship of trust and confidence between
organization and counsel, it will be difficult for this dialogue to be productive. In-house
counsel stress that it is important for the organization to first thoroughly consider the
issues itself, such that it knows what it wishes to accomplish and how to do so, before
turning to external advisors for assistance and advice.
24. See Robert W. Tarun & Peter P. Tomczak, A Proposal for A United States Department
of Justice Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Leniency Policy, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 153, 156 (2010)
(discussing the benefits of self-reporting as well as the dilemma of whether to self-report).
25. See generally F. Joseph Warin et al., Somebody’s Watching Me: FCPA Monitorships and
How They Can Work Better, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 321 (2011).
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categorization is necessary to organize the many variations that
exist.26

Indeed, executive and legislative commissions have often been at
odds, as each branch attempts to use the vehicle of the commissioned
public report to its own advantage:
It took Congress a mere three years after ratifying the Constitution to initiate its first investigation. In 1792, the House of Representatives passed a resolution directing a committee of seven
members to investigate the failed military expedition by Major
General St. Clair. The House rejected an executive inquiry into
the matter and instead ‘empowered an investigatory committee
. . . to summon witnesses, inspect records, and report back findings.’ . . . Congress continued to establish committees to conduct
investigations. During the early 1800s, Congress established joint
committees to investigate, among other things, the burning of
Washington, D.C. and Andrew Jackson’s invasion of Florida . . . By
the mid-nineteenth century, investigations had become a significant portion of congressional activity.27

1. Pearl Harbor: The Roberts Commission
The modern independent commission gained in stature during
the fallout from Pearl Harbor. In the wake of that attack, President
Roosevelt established the Roberts Commission, headed by Supreme
Court Justice Owen Roberts, to investigate and report on the facts
related to the assault and the American military response to it.28 The
report was highly criticized and spawned further congressional investigations and reports.29 Primary criticisms levied against the Roberts
Commission and its report included the following assertions: it was
assembled too hastily; its mandate was too narrow in scope; the independence of the members of the Commission from the executive
branch was open to doubt; the fact-collection process was compromised
by questionable methodology (due to the fact that interviews were
taken “off the record,” were unsworn, and came largely from military
officers without considering the perspectives of other stakeholders);
and the final result was too short and too vague (especially as regarded
26. Lance Cole, Special National Investigative Commissions: Essential Powers and Procedures (Some Lessons from the Pearl Harbor, Warren Commission, and 9/11 Commission Investigations), 41 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2009).
27. Ross et al., supra note 6, at 420–21.
28. See generally Roberts Commission Report, supra note 6.
29. Cole, supra note 26, at 4–5; Ross et al., supra note 6, at 428 (“Additionally, Congress created the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack after it
was dissatisfied with the investigation into Pearl Harbor by the Roberts Commission, an
Executive Branch entity chaired by Chief Justice Owen Roberts. Because the Roberts
Commission had taken just over one month to conduct an investigation that was criticized
for its narrow scope, off-the-record and unsworn interviews, and reliance on military
officers, the Joint Committee’s members were directed to ‘make a full and complete
investigation’ of the attack. Ultimately, the Joint Committee reviewed the findings of the
Roberts Commission and others, conducted six months of hearings, and returned with a
bipartisan majority report.”).

R
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the section on the possible involvement of Japanese spies). Notably, it
was also criticized for being overly focused on the public relations
aspect, to the exclusion of addressing systemic issues, such as scapegoating, without delving deep into the reasons why the attack had not been
anticipated by military defense in the first place.30 President Roosevelt
himself was reportedly dissatisfied with the result; he supposedly
handed it to his secretary after he read it with the quip that she ought
to “[g]ive that in full to the papers for their Sunday editions.”31
2. Warren Commission Report
Perhaps the most (in)famous commissioned report is the Warren
Commission Report.32 Informally known as the Warren Report, the
President’s Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy was
formed by Lyndon B. Johnson following the public shock of JFK’s assassination. Totaling 889 pages, it came to the simple—yet, in some
quarters, controversial—conclusion that Lee Harvey Oswald had acted
alone in killing the president. Criticism of the Report, like the document itself, has filled volumes. While much of the criticism was inevitable given the circumstances, and its findings have never been
discredited,33 the Warren Commission certainly failed to fully manage
the public relations crisis that stemmed from the assassination. Indeed,
certain aspects of the report only exacerbated that crisis. Characteristics of the Commission’s process included its perceived lack of independence (it relied heavily on investigative reports produced by the FBI),
its composition (the Commission’s membership was mostly lawyers),34
the time constraints imposed on its creation,35 and its alleged confirmation bias.36 However, the findings of the Commission did prompt the
Secret Service to make a number of changes to the way it conducted its
security procedures.37
3. 9/11 Commission Report
The most remarkable government-commissioned report in recent
history is likely the 9/11 Commission Report, which has been called a
“game changer” in this space.38 Released nearly two and a half years
after September 11, 2001, and providing a comprehensive report on
the attacks on that date, the report was met with widespread approba30. See Cole, supra note 26, at 13; Ross et al., supra note 6, at 428.
31. James Perloff, Pearl Harbor: Scapegoating Kimmel and Short, NEW AMERICAN (June
4, 2001), available at http://www.thenewamerican.com/culture/history/item/4742-pearlharbor-scapegoating-kimmel-and-short.
32. WARREN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6.
33. Cole, supra note 26, at 16.
34. Id. at 20–21, 37–38; see also GERALD D. MCKNIGHT, BREACH OF TRUST: HOW THE
WARREN COMMISSION FAILED THE NATION AND WHY 89, 107 (2005).
35. Cole, supra note 26, at 44.
36. Id. at 15; see also MCKNIGHT, supra note 34, at 89, 109, 213.
37. Anthony Lewis, Warren Commission Finds Oswald Guilty and Says Assassin and Ruby
Acted Alone; Rebukes Secret Service, Asks Revamping, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1964, at 1.
38. U.S. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT (2004) (hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT).
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tion. Totaling 585 pages, the report has been praised for its engrossing
narrative of that day’s events.39 The recommendations contained in
that report, however, have not been as well-received.40
4. Post-9/11 Government Reports
Since 2004, government release of public reports has become a
common response to crisis situations. Examples include the following:
Virginia Tech Report in 2007,41 which was released by the Governor of
Virginia; the Freeh Report,42 which was commissioned by the Board of
Trustees of Penn State University; the Fort Hood Report, released in
2010;43 the federal Accountability Review Board’s 2012 unclassified
report on the incidents in Benghazi;44 and the report commissioned by
the Governor of Connecticut on the Sandy Hook shootings.45 It is not
only organizations in the United States that utilize these reports. A
notable international example of a commissioned public report is the
Gjørv Report, which was ordered by the Norwegian parliament and concluded that both the bombing in Oslo in 2011 and the subsequent massacre on Utøya Island could have been prevented by the more efficient
utilization of security protocols.46
The use of the commissioned public report spans different types of
crises. Although this article will largely focus on how to respond to crises that originated outside of the organization mainly affected by it,
commissioned public reports can also be used to answer crises for
39. See, e.g., Mark Fenster, Designing Transparency: The 9/11 Commission and Institutional Form, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1239, 1296 (2008) (“Viewed this way, the Commission
enjoyed enormous—if not complete—bureaucratic success as an administrative institution by organizing public examination of the event and galvanizing official and public
opinion around remedial action. A catalyst at a moment of crisis that forced Congress to
seize the opportunity afforded by catastrophic intelligence failure, the Commission managed its conditions of existence in order to contribute to a period of significant organizational transformation. By any objective measure, the Commission influenced public
opinion, law, and government policy far beyond what could have been expected based on
the past performance of other advisory commissions.”); Richard A. Posner, The 9/11
Report: A Dissent, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2004), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/
08/29/books/the-9-11-report-a-dissent.html.
40. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, PREVENTING SURPRISE ATTACKS: INTELLIGENCE
REFORM IN THE WAKE OF 9/11 6 (2005) (criticizing the decision to include recommendations, as their inclusion might alter the findings to match the recommendations); Richard
A. Falkenrath, The 9/11 Commission Report: A Review Essay, 29 INT’L SEC. 170, 182–83 (Winter 2004-2005); Posner, supra note 39.
41. VA. TECH REVIEW PANEL, MASS SHOOTINGS AT VIRGINIA TECH (2007) (presented
to Va. Governor Timothy M. Kaine) (hereinafter VIRGINIA TECH REPORT).
42. FREEH SPORKIN & SULLIVAN, LLP, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COUNSEL REGARDING THE ACTIONS OF THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY RELATED TO THE
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE COMMITTED BY GERALD A. SANDUSKY (2012) [hereinafter FREEH
REPORT].
43. DEP’T OF DEF., PROTECTING THE FORCE: LESSONS FROM FORT HOOD (2010).
44. ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW BOARD, UNCLASSIFIED REPORT (2012), available at http:/
/www.state.gov /documents/organization/202446.pdf [hereinafter ACCOUNTABILITY
REVIEW BOARD’S BENGHAZI REPORT].
45. SANDY HOOK ADVISORY COMMITTEE, FINAL REPORT (forthcoming Feb. 2015).
46. RAPPORT FRA 22. JULI-KOMMISJONEN: PRELIMINARY ENGLISH VERSION OF SELECT
CHAPTERS (2012) [hereinafter GJøRV REPORT].
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which internal institutional factors bear primary responsibility. These
include the report on the prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib, released in
August 2004,47 the Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, which investigated
the systemic causes of the 2008 financial and economic crisis,48 and the
report critiquing the federal response to the devastation wreaked by
Hurricane Katrina.49
5. Other Government Reports
Government commissions continue to issue reports on occasion,
though recent years have seen the increased prominence of the public
commissioned report. This shift may largely be attributable to the
increased realization by public and private institutions of the potential
utilities that such reports promise in crisis management. Illustrative
public government fact-finding reports, issued from both the federal
and state levels, include the Oklahoma City Bombing Report (a statecommissioned report released in 1995, which was criticized for being
overly technical in nature and narrow in scope)50 and the Columbine
Report (a state report released in 2001 which is more typical of recent
reports in its comprehensiveness and detail).51
6. Corporate Reports
Private institutions have also begun to realize the benefits offered
by the commissioned public report. Like the public reports commissioned by government institutions, those initiated by private organizations address a broad variety of crises. They range from the discovery of
internal misconduct (the Enron, Shell, Mitchell, and Freeh Reports are
typical examples), to accidents (such as nuclear plant incidents),52 to
the more traditionally human-catalyzed crises (Statoil).
The revelation of pervasive and systemic accounting fraud at Enron
Corporation was a significant factor in the promulgation of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which, among other things, requires chief executive officers and chief financial officers to personally attest to the accuracy of their organizations’ accounts and records. Following the
discovery of the fraud and the resulting fallout, the corporation’s new
board of directors created a special investigative committee to examine
transactions between Enron and investment partnerships created and
47. INDEP. PANEL TO REVIEW DEP’T OF DEF. DETENTION OPERATIONS, FINAL REPORT
INDEPENDENT PANEL TO REVIEW DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DETENTION OPERATIONS,
FINAL REPORT (2004) [hereinafter ABU GHRAIB REPORT].
48. U.S. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC
CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES (2011).
49. FRANCIS TOWNSEND, THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS
LEARNED (2006).
50. OKLA. DEP’T OF CIVIL EMERGENCY MGMT., AFTER ACTION REPORT: ALFRED P. MURRAH FEDERAL BUILDING BOMBING, 19 APRIL 1995 IN OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA [hereinafter OKLAHOMA CITY BOMBING AFTER ACTION REPORT].
51. WILLIAM H. ERICKSON, GOVERNOR BILL OWENS’ COLUMBINE REVIEW COMMISSION,
REPORT (2001) [hereinafter COLUMBINE REPORT].
52. See, e.g., discussion of the Fukushima nuclear meltdown, infra.
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managed by Enron’s former CFO, Andrew Fastow, who reportedly bore
much of the responsibility for the fraud. The investigative committee’s
report examined the failure of institutional capacity to sense and prevent the conduct that led to the collapse, and stressed the importance
of a truly independent auditing function.53
An internal review conducted by Shell’s management in January of
2004 discovered that the company had misstated its reported oil
reserves. The Shell Group Audit Committee accordingly engaged Davis
Polk & Wardell to:
[A]ct as independent counsel and lead an investigation into the
facts and circumstances of the re-categorization . . . . Broadly
speaking, Davis Polk’s mandate was to investigate, thoroughly and
expeditiously, the conduct of Shell’s involved management and to
determine whether remedial actions were warranted, both in
terms of personnel changes and broader control measures.54

Although the report was not released in full at the time, it included
reference to correspondence suggesting that top executives were aware
of the inaccuracies in the reporting of their oil reserves and that their
efforts to bring such concerns to the attention of other individuals at
the senior management level were insufficient.55 The examination and
its findings led to the company’s public acknowledgement of the need
to address structural deficiencies and its decision to institute reforms to
the corporate structure.56 Though the entire report was not made public, Davis Polk did release a 52-page “Executive Summary”—a document
that comports with the traditional understanding of a commissioned
public report in all material respects.
The 2007 Mitchell Report, formally known as the Report to the
Commissioner of Baseball of an Independent Investigation into the Illegal Use of Steroids and Other Performance Enhancing Substances by
Players in Major League Baseball, reflected former Senator George J.
Mitchell’s (D-ME) investigation into the use of performance-enhancing
drugs in Major League Baseball.57 The Commissioner of Baseball initiated Mitchell’s investigation following the publication of allegations
that human growth hormone and anabolic steroids were used in the
league; the report is notable and highly instructive due to its self-reflective and highly public nature.
53. SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMM. OF THE BD. OF DIRS. OF ENRON CORP., REPORT OF
INVESTIGATION (2002) [hereinafter POWERS REPORT].
54. DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL, REPORT TO THE SHELL GROUP AUDIT COMMITTEE 3
(2004).
55. Another Head Rolls in the Boardroom, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 22, 2004), http://
www.economist.com/node/2608070. Shell released a summary of the report’s final version that made reference to key correspondence between high-level company executives.
56. Among these structural reforms was the decision to institute the practice of
using external experts to conduct an annual verification review of its stated reserves. Id.
57. GEORGE J. MITCHELL, REPORT TO THE COMMISSIONER OF BASEBALL OF AN INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION INTO THE ILLEGAL USE OF STEROIDS AND OTHER PERFORMANCE
ENHANCING SUBSTANCES BY PLAYERS IN MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL (2007) [hereinafter MITCHELL REPORT].
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The Freeh Report was commissioned in 2012 by a task force operating on behalf of The Pennsylvania State University’s Board of Trustees to “perform an independent, full and complete investigation of:
[t]he alleged failure of Pennsylvania State University personnel to
respond to, and report to the appropriate authorities, the sexual abuse
of children by former University football coach Gerald A. Sandusky,”
and “[t]he circumstances under which such abuse could occur in University facilities or under the auspices of University programs for
youth.”58 Written by the law firm of Freeh, Sporkin & Sullivan LLP, the
mandate of the report also included providing “recommendations
regarding University governance, oversight, and administrative policies
and procedures [to] better enable the University to prevent and more
effectively respond to incidents of sexual abuse of minors in the
future.”59 Following the discovery of the abuse, the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools’ Commission on Higher Education, the
University’s accreditor, had given the University a warning over its handling of the scandal and asked that it submit a report documenting the
compliance of its finances and governance controls with applicable
accreditation standards. Following the issuance of the report, the
accreditation team reaffirmed the University’s accreditation and noted
that it was “impressed by the degree to which Penn State has risen, as a
strong campus community, to recognize and respond to the sad events”
of the scandal.60
In the wake of the terrorist attack on its In Amenas facility mentioned earlier in this Article Statoil took the rather atypical step of issuing a commissioned public report “to determine the relevant chain of
events . . . and to enable Statoil to further improve in the areas of security, risk assessment, and emergency preparedness.”61 The report was
fairly critical of the security measures that Statoil and its joint venture
partners had put into place, especially relative to the risks. It ultimately
gave 19 recommendations on how to strengthen the company’s security
measures in areas including “organization and capabilities, security risk
management systems, emergency preparedness and response, and
cooperation and networks.” The overarching conclusion of the report
was that “Statoil has established a security risk management system, but
the company’s overall capabilities and culture must be strengthened to
respond to the security risks associated with operations in volatile and
complex environments.”62
58. FREEH REPORT, supra note 42, at 8.
59. Id.
60. Nick DeSantis, Accreditor Lifts Warning Placed on Penn State for Handling of SexAbuse Scandal, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC. (Nov. 16, 2012), http://chronicle.com/
blogs/ticker/accreditor-lifts-warning-placed-on-penn-state-for-handling-of-sex-abusescandal/51926.
61. IN AMENAS REPORT, supra note 3, at 1.
62. Publication of the Investigation Report on the In Amenas Terrorist Attack, STATOIL,
(Sept. 12, 2013, 12:00 PM), http://www.statoil.com/en/NewsAndMedia/News/2013/
Pages/12Sep_InAmenas_report.aspx.
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B. Deciding Whether to Publish: Strategic Considerations
The key characteristic shared by all of the commissioned public
reports discussed so far in this Article is very simple—they exist. In
each case, those responsible for crisis management in their respective
affected organizations made the decision that the advantages of commissioning a public report outweighed the disadvantages of doing so,
and that such a report would be a critical part of the crisis management
response.
Deciding whether or not to publish requires that the decisionmaker balance the various associated advantages and disadvantages of
doing so. The position of this Article is that it may often be to an organization’s advantage to publish, if the end result is properly constructed,
although there will naturally be circumstances in which this position
will not hold true, i.e., under which publication may not be the best
course. As in any case, the specific facts and legal considerations of the
situation will determine the advisability of pursuing publication. Here,
we set forth the factors that one should consider as part of that decision-making process.
Advantages
The primary reason to publish the report is to provide the organization that is the subject of the report and of the associated external
coverage with a meaningful opportunity to control the narrative surrounding the catastrophic event. A commissioned public report allows
the affected organization to set the stage for the management of the
three crises discussed earlier in the Article on its own terms (insofar as
the independence of the report’s authors remains assured). The report
is perhaps the best way in which an organization can maintain control
over the agenda without simultaneously becoming subject to accusations of biased self-evaluation. Although independent persons will
author the report, the commissioning organization can set its scope,
thus cabining the extent to which it is put under the microscope and
narrowing exposure (without compromising the objectivity of the
report)—legal and otherwise. A timely capture of the narrative is especially pertinent given the increasing influence of social media on determining the public response to crisis. We term this the “race to the
narrative” and note that timeliness is especially important under these
circumstances.
Several companies have suffered in recent years due to their failure
to control the narrative. Following a 2010 pipeline explosion in San
Bruno, California, Pacific Gas & Electric (“PG&E”) opted not to commission a report to investigate what went wrong.63 A subsequent report
ordered by the California Public Utilities Commission thus controlled
the narrative, and presented the public with a version of events casting
PG&E in a sharply negative light.64 The report chastised PG&E for an
63. See Maria L. LaGanga & Marc Lifsher, Independent Panel Criticizes PG&E for Lapses
that Led to San Bruno Pipeline Blast, L.A. TIMES (June 10, 2011), available at http://articles
.latimes.com/2011/jun/10/local/la-me-san-bruno-20110610.
64. See id.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\29-1\NDE103.txt

2015]

unknown

Seq: 19

20-APR-15

COMMISSIONED PUBLIC REPORT AS CRISIS-MANAGEMENT TOOL

10:11

105

“insular mindset” and a “corporate myopia,” focusing public scrutiny
onto the firm’s culture and leadership.65 Similarly, Tokyo Electric
Power Company (“TEPCO”) faced acute criticism in the official report
issued by the Japanese government following the nuclear meltdown at
Fukushima in 2011.66 A well-crafted narrative commissioned by
TEPCO might have mitigated the brunt of the blame, which was exacerbated by charges in the government report that “TEPCO’s management
mindset of ‘obedience to authority’ hindered their response.”67
As this Article emphasizes, the publication of a public report holds
great promise for the strengthening of institutional capabilities both in
terms of crisis management and crisis prevention. An independent
review of an institution’s strengths and weaknesses may avoid the selfserving bias and fear of confronting the status quo that could threaten
self-evaluations. The publication of public report findings, moreover,
may serve as a mechanism to ensure that needed reforms are implemented, as the organization will thus be accountable to an external
task-master: the public.
An institution which commissions a public report may also gain
credibility with the public, thus countering the potential for external
criticisms of corporate malaise. This vehicle indicates that an institution is appropriately appreciative of the severity of the traumatic event
and acknowledges its responsibility—if not for the incident, for its
response thereto, and for preventing recurrence. (Though, frequently,
organizations may have no responsibility for the event, they are consistently perceived to be responsible for addressing its aftermath). The
commissioning of a public report is arguably an expression of corporate
morality, indicating the seriousness of an organization’s commitment to
mounting an appropriate response. Olympus Corporation benefited
greatly in the wake of its 2011 accounting fraud scandal from what was
seen as an open and transparent effort to rectify its wrongs. The company presented its commissioned report as an apology to its shareholders and the public at large, making the report available on the front
page of its website below a large masthead reading: “Taking this opportunity, we once again extend (sic) our deepest apologies to Olympus
shareholders, customers, business partners, and all stakeholders, for the
significant trouble we have caused them.”68
Following from the increased credibility that accrues to an organization that has chosen to manage its crisis through the vehicle of a commissioned public report, there may be a corresponding psychological
effect on the volume of lawsuits that follow. Although it is almost inevitable that, where there is disaster, there will be legal action, credible
efforts of a company to effectively respond to and prevent catastrophe
65. Id.
66. NAT’L DIET OF JAPAN, OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR ACCIDENT
INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION COMMISSION (2012).
67. Id. at 33.
68. Eleanor Bloxham, What U.S. Companies Can Learn From Olympus, FORTUNE (Jan.
26, 2012, 3:48 PM), http://fortune.com/2012/01/26/what-u-s-companies-can-learnfrom-olympus/.
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may disincline certain demographics to turn to the justice system. Litigation is, after all, costly, and good-faith efforts to mitigate disaster may
both erode the legal basis for suit and temper putative plaintiffs’ desire
to pursue it. In those lawsuits that are brought, the institution may
point to its strong response as a factor that mitigates subsequent penalties in sentencing.
Disadvantages
One of the greatest disadvantages of publication is the likelihood
that the audience to which the report is directed does not fully appreciate the import of the decision to release a report of this nature. The
public may expect an institution to respond in this manner as a matter
of course. The reality, of course, is that commissioning a public report
is a very bold move. Doing so exposes the corporation to widespread
criticism, provides a “company statement” that can be used as admission
in legal proceedings, and may even provide an advantage to corporate
competitors, as the case may be. Moreover, turning the process over to
a panel of independent authors entails a certain loss of control over
information: what is disclosed, and how it is disclosed. This binds the
corporation to taking certain next steps that may not always be in its
best interest. At the same time, failure to proceed transparently where
such is expected may plunge the institution deeper into crisis.
III. IDENTIFYING

A

FRAMEWORK THAT RESPONDS

TO THE

THREE CRISES

The overarching aim of this Article is to provide a framework for
the writing of an effective report, the success of which is dependent on
the extent to which it adequately addresses the primary three crises
identified in Section I.A, supra. With those three crises firmly in mind,
then, we turn to specific recommendations for achieving that end.
A. Initial Steps
1. Composition: Experts or Insiders?
The critical first step in formulating a commissioned public report
is determining its composition. Although it may be tempting to populate the investigative team with insiders, doing so is a pitfall that should
be assiduously avoided. The commission responsible for investigating
the crisis and coming up with the findings that will form the basis for
the report should be led by experts whose independence from the subject of investigation is both visible and assured. A team whose independence is doubtful may not only nullify the hoped-for effects of the
report (restoring faith in the institution, mitigating the PR crisis, dampening potential for legal exposure, and ultimately strengthening the
institutional structure in order to make it better able to withstand
future assaults), it may worsen the crisis. If an entity appears to be commissioning a public report in a self-serving way, to bolster its own image
at the expense of the truth, the public may turn hostile. Just as importantly, lack of independence on the part of the evaluating team may
render it unable or unwilling to critically assess the institutional weak-
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nesses that contributed to the occurrence of the crisis in the first place.
With that in mind, it is also important to look beyond the traditional
consideration of independence from the subject institution in constituting the team. Fidelity to political bias or personal agenda could be similarly fatal both to the effectiveness of a report and the mitigation of a
crisis.
As Ide and Yarn note, independence ensures thoroughness, accuracy, and the validity of the fact-finding enterprise:
Independence may result in a more thorough investigation
because people who might otherwise fear retaliation from other
corporate constituents will be more willing to talk to someone
who does not answer to those corporate constituents and who can
assure them some degree of confidentiality.69

An investigation, and the report that summarizes it, cannot address
and remedy institutional weaknesses without this independence.
Results may be skewed, lacking in critical analysis, and tethered to the
agenda of the status quo and those hoping to avoid personal responsibility for the events occurring during their tenure. Additionally, independence is essential for addressing the public relations crisis. Ide and
Yarn note that the effectiveness of public independent fact-finding,
from a public relations perspective, “rests almost solely on the public
reputation of the fact finder.”70 The success of the 9/11 Commission,71
noted earlier, lends credence to this assertion; commentators noted
that, “[F]rom a public relations standpoint, [the Commission’s] losing
battles [to get access to information] burnished [its] public reputation,
legitimating its investigation.” At the same time, lessons learned from
that Commission add nuance to our understanding of “independence”
and the promises it holds out. Richard Posner, while generally appreciative of the Report’s quality and contributions, criticized its bipartisan,
rather than nonpartisan, composition, suggesting that compromise
between the competing ideologies resulted in a report that achieved
unanimity at the expense of candor. “Independence” is not achieved
by creating a balance between ideologues, but through a group of nonpartisans—people whose main objective is not to prove a point, but to
find the truth.72 It is, however, essential that a report not oversell its
own independence. This is also an issue that is related to scope (discussed infra). A report should sufficiently modulate assertions about
the extent to which it will be released free from internal intervention.
69. See Ide & Yarn, supra note 11, at 1146.
70. Id. at 1153.
71. See POSNER, supra note 40, at 3 (“The idea of a politically balanced, generously
funded committee of experienced people who would investigate the nation’s failure to
prevent the 9/11 attacks struck me as sound; had the investigation been left to the government, the administration would have concealed its own mistakes, and blamed its predecessors.”); Fenster, supra note 39, at 1243 (“The Commission declared and attempted to
maintain—and, equally importantly, appeared to maintain—independence from the political, military, intelligence, and regulatory institutions and actors it studied. The news
media and public followed the Commission’s operations, and its final report was widely
read. Congress and the Executive Branch adopted many of its recommendations.”).
72. POSNER, supra note 40, at 7–8.
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The primary motivation for such a consideration is legal. Although a
report should be able to satisfactorily address the public concerns arising in the wake of a crisis, it should not also trigger significant legal
exposure for the commissioning entity. The company’s rights should
also be maintained, within reason. To that end, the publicity surrounding the report should reserve, though not emphasize, the right for the
company’s lawyers to review it prior to release. This is important to
maintain a company’s legal rights and shield any privileged issues from
public exposure; it need not be inconsistent with being able to offer the
public a comprehensive narrative of what has occurred and how the
company aims to prevent recurrence.
A well-written report constructs a narrative that softens the public
towards the affected entity, relieving it of some portion of the blame for
the crisis. Hearit calls this narrative an apologia, and notes that a “successful” one “gets the organization off the front page” even when it
amounts to an admission of wrongdoing.73 The term is apt—a successful apologia is one which mends broken relationships,74 here one
between the organization and its public—constituents or otherwise.
But a report that lacks adequate independence can have the opposite
effect. The Roberts Report discussed previously is illustrative of this
possibility.75 The Mitchell Report76 and Accountability Review Board’s
Benghazi Report were also attacked on lack of independence
grounds,77 and their effectiveness suffered as a result. “Independent,”
however, should not be understood to mean “adversarial.” A team that
can work with the insiders, without itself being considered one of them,
is likely to produce the most meaningful work, insofar as it can achieve
access without being consequently challenged as having been
coopted.78 Antagonism towards the subject institution will only shut
73. HEARIT, supra note 17, at 36.
74. See AARON LAZARE, ON APOLOGY (2005).
75. Cole, supra note 26, at 12–13.
76. See, e.g., Howard Bryant, Friction and Fractures Erode Faith in Mitchell’s Investigation,
ESPN (Dec. 11, 2007), http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=3142651 (discussing the potential lack of independence of Mitchell and others writing the Mitchell Report
on steroids in baseball); Murray Chass, Mitchell and His Team Have Some Noteworthy Ties,
N.Y. TIMES, (Apr. 1, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/01/sports/baseball/01
chass.html (discussing the same); see also Ilya Somin, The Mitchell Report, the Red Sox and
Conflicts of Interest, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, (Dec. 13, 2007), http://www.volokh.com/posts/
1197608171.shtml.
77. See, e.g., COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOV’T REFORM, BENGHAZI ATTACKS: INVESTIGATIVE UPDATE: INTERIM REPORT ON THE ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW BD. 23 (2013) (“There
are Weaknesses in the ARB’s Independence.”).
78. See, e.g., IN AMENAS REPORT, supra note 3, at 3 (mandate creating an internal
resource group of Statoil employees to aid the commission in research). Three members
of the company’s Corporate Audit group were party to the investigation team. They were
able to share their knowledge of the Statoil organization and its systems and the investigation’s methodology with the commission. We suggest that an organization which has
commissioned a public report might consider providing the commission a link to such a
resource—organization personnel who provide insight into the organization upon consultation—while, of course, maintaining full responsibility and control over the report
with the independent commission. See also Fenster, supra note 39, at 1281 (“Paradoxically, the [9/11] Commission’s insider nature enabled it to procure records and inter-
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doors to communication and thus to valid and comprehensive fact-finding results. In other words, independence needs to achieve a balance
between objectivity and fair treatment of, or respect for, the institution
that is the subject of a public report.
Although independence should remain the primary consideration
in determining the composition of the investigative commission, it is
also important to take account of less intuitively obvious factors that
nonetheless possess the potential to aid or hinder the report’s usefulness for the organization. One such consideration is a warning—be
wary of the “big name.” Well-known, public personalities are often also
polarizing, and their involvement in the endeavor can be both a distraction and a detriment. The reader of the report may focus not so much
on its content as on its author, and may be more or less likely to accept
its conclusions based on preexisting perceptions of the same. Early candidates nominated to lead the 9/11 Commission, for example, were a
significant distraction from the main task.79 Both the Roberts and Warren Commissions were led by Supreme Court Justices; though their participation was perhaps symbolically indicative of their independence, it
nonetheless may have weakened their reports because of their public
stature and legal positions on key issues.80 Moreover, the allegiances of
well-known personalities are often public; where their impartiality is not
assured, or, worse, their partiality is confirmed—by fact or by rumor—
their involvement may doom the report’s success from the start. Such
was the case with the Mitchell Report, which was criticized for its
leader’s noted fan fidelities:
[I]t was a mistake for baseball Commissioner Bud Selig to appoint
Mitchell to head this inquiry. Even if there wasn’t any bias in
Mitchell’s investigation, there was certainly a conflict of interest—
a conflict exacerbated by the longstanding Yankees-Red Sox
rivalry and the prominence of Yankees players among those
accused of steroids use. Surely Selig could have found some other
elder statesman to take on this job, one with no affiliations with
any major league team.81

Notwithstanding the above, of course, Senator Mitchell’s reputation for
integrity is beyond reproach, and he has overseen much more challenging international inquiries, including efforts to forge peace in Northern
Ireland.82 It is important that the team include figures with respectable
views while retaining its nominal independence. Its greatest successes in hard-fought
battles with the White House over information resulted in part from many of the commissioners’ reputations as trustworthy Washingtonians, at once above the political fray and
respectful of political propriety.”).
79. Cole, supra note 26, at 38 (discussing the thwarted selections of Kissinger and
Mitchell to lead 9/11 Commissions); Falkenrath, supra note 40, at 173.
80. See Cole, supra note 26, at 18.
81. Somin, supra note 76.
82. See, e.g., Nicholas Watt, George Mitchell’s Patient Diplomacy Shepherded Northern Ireland to Peace. Now for the Middle East, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 23, 2009). See also, George Mitchell: Building Peace in Northern Ireland, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE GLOBAL
PEACEBUILDING CENTER, available at http://www.buildingpeace.org/teach-visit-us-and-
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public reputations.83 A report written entirely by a cohort of unknowns
may be unlikely to command the respect, or even attention, of the public it hopes to influence.
Including lawyers and experts in the investigative team is wise to
ensure that an eye is kept on potential legal issues that arise during the
course of the fact-finding and as the report goes to press. Even if no
issues of liability are uncovered, any post-crisis report has the potential
to negatively impact pending litigation, or even initiate new suits.
Including a lawyer on the team means keeping constant watch on
whether the report has a negative, positive, or no impact on pending
litigation, and, more importantly, the long-term outlook for the organization. Knowing the potential issues, a lawyer can address them in real
time and thus prevent greater damage to the organization down the
road. As legal consequences are all but inevitable, and the question
therefore becomes only the degree of exposure, lawyers should play a
central role in crafting the post-crisis report, because they are instrumental in navigating the consequences to civil and criminal litigation,
and the long-term legal outlook for the organization.84
Legal advice on the privilege issues that are doubtless to arise during fact-finding, and the propriety and legality of their publication to
the public, is also crucial to any successful report.85 Regardless of the
learn/exhibits/witnesses-peacebuilding/george-mitchell-building-peace-northern-ir (last
visited Mar. 22, 2015).
83. See Ide & Yarn, supra note 11, at 1146–47, 1153 (“PIFF’s effectiveness rests
almost solely on the public reputation of the fact finder.”).
84. See Jay G. Martin, Developing an Effective Crisis Management Plan for a Corporation,
65 TEX. B.J. 232, 237 (2002) (“Lawyers should play a key role in the design of every crisis
management plan and every company’s response to a crisis. As mentioned earlier, in
virtually every crisis, in addition to negative press coverage, there are regulatory actions,
civil litigation, and possible criminal investigations which fall within the lawyer’s areas of
responsibility. A lawyer needs to make sure that as managers gather facts on an expedited
basis in a super-charged environment and disclose information to the media and its constituencies, these actions do not unduly compromise the company’s legal position in
future litigation and regulatory actions.”).
85. See, e.g., Kevin Feeney & Jay W. Brown, Assisting Your Company in Times of Crisis,
36 ADVOC. TEX. 30, 32–33 (2006) (“In Texas, the attorney-client privilege protects the
company from disclosure of certain communications related to professional legal services
it receives. The privilege generally extends to the following communications: those
between the company or a representative of the company and the company’s lawyer or a
representative of the lawyer; those between the lawyer and the lawyer’s representative;
those by the company or a representative of the company, or the company’s lawyer or a
representative of the lawyer, to a lawyer or a representative of a lawyer representing
another party in a pending action and concerning a matter of common interest therein;
those between representatives of the company or between the company and a representative of the company; and those among lawyers and their representatives representing the
same company.” (citation omitted)). See also Ide & Yarn, supra note 11, at 1162–64 (“In
general, the representational role has distinct advantages for the process. If an attorneyclient relationship is formed, the fact finder’s notes, certain communications between
client and fact finder, and other information gained in the course of the representation
are protected by the work-product doctrine, the attorney-client privilege, and the lawyer’s
duty of confidentiality. From our experience, corporate decisionmakers are increasingly
concerned with the costs and liability of litigation and would be reluctant to engage in the
fact-finding process, much less to share information, without some guarantees of confidentiality. Also, employees need to feel that they can speak in confidence. To the extent
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extent to which certain communications and discrete pieces of information are privileged, any team must address the degree to which the
investigation itself or portions of it are privileged, especially where outsiders participate in examining sensitive legal issues. This is a complicated and fact-specific issue that will require a lawyer’s input.86
Including experts is also essential to any effective report.87 The
participation of individuals with the capacity, skills, and education to
recognize what precisely has gone wrong in various situations is essential not only to ensure that the report’s findings are accurate and comprehensively investigated, but also that the report will bear indicia of
credibility both in the specialized community and among the public at
large. An investigation of a technological catastrophe without an engineer, for example, would likely produce a report of severely diminished
credibility. At the same time, it is best that the technical aspects of an
investigation that fall under expert purview do not end up dominating
the report. A report that is inaccessible to laypersons and the general
public, that is more “jargon” than narrative, will not only be ineffective
in changing the narrative, but may be accused of being a cover-up—
made indecipherable to obfuscate dark truths about organizational
responsibility.
2. Disciplining the Scope of an Investigation and Report
Most tragedies are large and complex, with many actors playing
many roles. Unraveling what precisely occurred, and who precisely is
responsible, is a significant undertaking which may become unnecessarily unwieldy if its scope is not firmly controlled. In order to ensure that
the scope of the investigation is commensurate with the goals it is
meant to achieve, it is therefore crucial that scope be defined at the
outset. “Scoping” an investigation requires first that the relevant decision-makers come to a consensus about what they aim to achieve
through an investigation and the publication of its results. In identifying the goal of an investigation, it is important to consider the three
crises, with a paramount focus remaining on the institutional crisis.
Addressing the crisis in this way should be set out as a mandate that
guides the entire subsequent process.
Defining a scope at the outset has practical advantages that cannot
be underemphasized. Maintaining privilege is one such benefit—the
agreement between counsel and management to scope the investigaconfidentiality improves the thoroughness of the investigation by helping the fact finder
gain access to information that otherwise would not be shared, it improves the process
and the accuracy of the report. Additionally, other confidential matters such as trade
secrets may be involved.”); Schallert & Williams, supra note 20, at 302 (discussing legal
risks of writing a public investigative report). For more on legal issues, see generally Schallert & Williams, supra note 20.
86. See generally Dennis J. Block & Nancy E. Barton, Implications of the Attorney-Client
Privilege and Work-Product Doctrine, in INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 20,
at 17 (discussing the multiple factors and split in authority as to whether publishing a
report after an internal investigation waives attorney-client privilege).
87. See POSNER, supra note 40, at 9–10 (criticizing the lack of intelligence experts on
the 9/11 Commission).
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tion to particular parameters, and to strictly conform all services
thereto, will help to protect its results from unwanted disclosure.88
Another benefit is in efficiency: foregoing unnecessary expense and disclosure. For example, the Oklahoma City Bombing Report, commissioned by the Oklahoma Department of Civil Emergency Management,
focused its investigation on the response to that crisis.89 As the quality
and nature of that response was the specialty of the commissioning
unit, this was exactly what the report needed to focus on—what went
wrong, and how to shore up institutional response processes and procedures against similar future crises. This was the appropriate way to deal
with the institutional crisis: veering into other areas would have given
little return to the institution.
The focused inquiry of the Oklahoma City Bombing Report stands
in contrast to the broad mandate of the 9/11 Commission. Given the
scope of the federal government, and the breadth of implicated subinstitutions, stating a sweeping mandate may have been a necessary
evil;90 however, the resulting lack of specific and directed recommendations suggests that it may have yet been too broad.91 Vague suggestions
for improvement are ultimately difficult, if not impossible, to implement. When this is the case, the result, if not the intent, of such a
report may be to address the PR crisis at the expense of the arguably
more important institutional one.
Practical limitations may discipline the scope of an investigation
and report to practical boundaries. The federal government had both
the will and the resources to implement a wide-ranging investigation
following the events of 9/11 and likely thought that a more restricted
scope would be self-defeating in the face of mass public outcry. Statoil,
like most companies, did not have the capacity to address such a wealth
of resources to the investigation of a singular event. Accordingly, it
prefaced its report-creation process by instituting a two-part mandate:
(1) to clarify the chain of events; and (2) to “facilitate learning and
further improvements within risk assessment, security, and emergency
preparedness.”92 In this case, achieving the first goal was a necessary
precondition to achieving the second. Statoil’s publication of the mandate of its report reflected the company’s desire to manage public
expectations as to its content and thus the backlash that would likely
have occurred had it, to the contrary, oversold its future results.
Though some degree of limitation is necessary to discipline the process
and avoid waste, one should beware of overly limiting the mandate at
the outset. The Mitchell Report, for example, which had as one of its
88. See Barry F. McNeil & Brad D. Brian, in INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS,
supra note 20, at 9–10 (Barry F. McNeil & Brad D. Brian, eds., 3d ed. 2007).
89. See OKLAHOMA CITY BOMBING AFTER ACTION REPORT, supra note 50, at 15 (“This
report is limited to an emergency management perspective.”).
90. See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 38, at xv.
91. See Cole, supra note 26, at 30.
92. Publication of the Investigation Report on the In Amenas Terrorist Attack, supra note
62; see IN AMENAS REPORT, supra note 3, at 1 (“This Report aims to answer two main questions: What happened at In Amenas between 16 and 19 January 2013? What can Statoil
learn to improve security and emergency preparedness for the future?”).
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stated aims the identification of players in violation of the steroid policy, thus restricted the inquiry to looking at the trees at the expense of
the forest—at individual wrongdoers, as opposed to at the environment
that made such abuse possible.93 The Wells Report, which limited its
scope to a factual determination of whether bullying had occurred in
the Miami Dolphins locker room, was widely praised for meeting its
stated goal; however, as a consequence, the report is believed to have
failed to address the institutional lapses that created such a pervasively
hostile environment.94
Once a mandate has been set, the focus of the investigation should
be further clarified by the creation of a list of topics to address. A mandate is inherently aspirational and abstract; choosing concrete topics
and tasks focuses that mandate and sets forth a work plan for its accomplishment.95 This step poses a potential pitfall—the inclination, in
assigning discrete topics for investigation, is too narrow. Smaller tasks,
more specifically defined, are easier to accomplish. However, it is
important that practicality not be the enemy of the good—that is, the
overall mandate. The tension between broad and narrow should be
resolved in favor of achieving the overall objective. This is conceptually
similar to the deficiency identified in the Mitchell Report, and was likewise believed to be a flaw in the Freeh Report—focusing on assigning
individual blame rather than addressing institutional shortcomings.
The task of identifying the particular deficiencies of individuals in the
Penn State scandal, while easier to manage than a wide-ranging critique
of the more intangible environment at issue in the sports program, also
partially defeated the report’s mandate. Scapegoating is a distraction
from the overall issue of how moral abuses came to be tolerated.96
Reports perceived to focus too narrowly on the technical issues of a
disaster may detract from their ability to assist the corporation with
dealing with its PR crisis.
The question, then, is how to manage this tension; how broad or
narrow should the scope of the investigation be? Ultimately, it is preferable to err on the side of a broader, as opposed to a more restricted,
focus. The next crisis will not be identical to the one analyzed; accordingly, to have the greatest effect, the goal of the report should be to
help the institution improve with its crisis management generally.
Although the extent to which any one report based on a specific incident can achieve this is, of course, limited—and such limitations should
be acknowledged—having this as the goal will make the report more
meaningful and effective in mitigating not only the current crisis, but
future ones as well. This is, of course, easier said than done. Achieving
93. See MITCHELL REPORT, supra note 57, at 2 (defining one aspect of mandate as
identifying individuals in violation of MLB drug policy).
94. See THEODORE V. WELLS, JR. ET AL., REPORT TO THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE
CONCERNING ISSUES OF WORKPLACE CONDUCT AT THE MIAMI DOLPHINS (2014).
95. See, e.g., IN AMENAS REPORT, supra note 3, at 1 (setting out a specific set of topics
for investigation); VIRGINIA TECH REPORT, supra note 41, at 5 (specifying six main tasks at
the outset).
96. See FREEH REPORT, supra note 42, at 9.
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the proper scope is a delicate balancing act in which many factors must
be taken into account.
A commissioned public report that is properly scoped, and thus
effective in achieving its goal of addressing the three crises described by
this Article, must be both narrow enough to provide specific recommendations and broad enough that the investigation can allow and
adapt to the discovery of unexpected facts. The aim is to create parameters that will facilitate the formation of creative solutions to specific
problems. Paradoxically, it is essential to avoid making the scope of the
investigation so broad that it becomes narrow. The 9/11 Commission
Report is illustrative of this peril. That report, which addressed a wide
range of topics—from the threat of terrorism to the vulnerability of air
travel to the safety of buildings—concluded with a set of recommendations on how to prevent terrorists from using airplanes to bomb buildings. As the mandate broadens, the report’s conclusions necessarily
become more and more limited to the facts of the catalyzing crisis.
With the 9/11 Commission Report, the focus of the investigation on so
many topics meant that, to make it manageable, investigators had to
focus on a specific set of circumstances within each broader topic.
Accordingly, no single area was thoroughly assessed on its own merits.
The report therefore had far less general application than it might otherwise have had.97
The first attempts made to produce a comprehensive report on 9/
11 were also too narrow, but in a different way. Like the Roberts Commission report on the attack on Pearl Harbor, the review was conducted
by one sector of government on the topics relevant to that sector, and it
failed to address the more comprehensive systemic failures that enabled
the terrorist assault to occur: “[b]ecause it was conducted by congressional intelligence committees . . . the Inquiry narrowly focused only on
issues related to intelligence failures and, therefore, did not study the
failures of counter-terrorism policies in the Clinton and Bush administrations on federal and local responses to the attacks.”98
Moreover, the restrictions placed on its members’ access to documents frustrated the effort in a way that exacerbated the crisis rather
than mitigated it. Commission members,
[T]ried, but failed, to obtain sensitive information from the Executive Branch, which refused some congressional requests for documents. Worse, the White House refused to declassify some
documents it did disclose, which resulted in a heavily redacted
final report that failed to satisfy public demand for an open investigation into the attacks.99

Failure to manage the PR crisis led to greater criticism by the public of an effort that was meant to provide comfort in a time of great
uncertainty regarding the national vulnerability to future acts of aggres97. See generally Posner, supra note 39 (criticizing the 9/11 Report for making recommendations limited to a replay of 9/11).
98. Fenster, supra note 39, at 1270.
99. Id.
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sion. Lack of transparency led to criticisms that the administration did
not trust the public and may in fact have been trying to insulate itself
from backlash for its own role in having allowed the attack to occur.
Indeed, the report “itself acknowledged the limitations of the Joint
Inquiry’s investigation and viewed an independent commission as a
necessary corrective measure.”100
In light of these negative examples—illustrations of what not to
do—the Gjørv report presents a model to emulate. That report clearly
stated its parameters and acknowledged its own limitations with forthrightness and humility:
We have foregone issues related to the perpetrator’s motive, childhood[,] and state of health, and we have not explored the measures society puts in place for the early prevention of
radicalization [sic]. The limitations do not imply that these questions are not important. Quite to the contrary. They are important and they deserve more attention than what this Commission
could manage to devote to them.101

In so doing, it both avoided the hazards of taking on too much and
garnered credibility with its audience.
3. Timely or Comprehensive?
Another factor to mark in the initial stages of planning a report is
whether to issue the report quickly, thus providing an as-near-to-immediate response to the crisis as is practically possible, or to wait and produce a more considered and comprehensive reply. A focus on
institutional crisis advises that we err on the side of comprehension.
While timeliness is important, and some public statements may of
course be necessary as the crisis unfolds and in its immediate aftermath,
rushing to publication can compromise the narrative in a way that has
significant potential to make the report unhelpful or even damaging.
The Freeh Report is instructive in this regard; it was subject to criticism from observers,102 Paterno family lawyers,103 and independent
arbitrators104 due to its perceived haste in drawing factual conclusions
from incomplete evidence. Some of the report’s factual findings were
found to be demonstrably false, while others remain unsubstantiated by
verifiable records or testimony. The seven month timeline between
Paterno’s removal as head football coach and the release of the report
amplified the criticism, as exemplified by the title of the Paterno fam100. Id.
101. GJøRV REPORT, supra note 45, at 9.
102. See Cindy Boren, Nike’s Phil Knight Reverses Stance on Joe Paterno After Family’s
Report Is Released, WASH. POST (Feb. 11, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
early-lead/wp/2013/02/11/nikes-phil-knight-reverses-stance-on-joe-paterno-after-familysreport-is-released/.
103. KING & SPALDING, CRITIQUE OF THE FREEH REPORT: THE RUSH TO INJUSTICE
REGARDING JOE PATERNO 13 (2013).
104. See Matt Carroll, Arbiter Rules Sandusky’s Penn State Pension Should Be Reinstated,
CENTRE DAILY TIMES (June 23, 2014), http://www.centredaily.com/2014/06/23/
4237043/arbiter-rules-sanduskys-penn-state.html.
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ily’s report response: “Critique of the Freeh Report: The Rush to Injustice Regarding Joe Paterno.”105
An emphasis in the commissioned public report to address the
institutional crisis as its primary focus explains that the report’s main
virtue is to help prevent the future, as-yet-unforeseen crisis. It takes
time to see the forest through the trees. Publishing a report when all of
the relevant facts remain undiscovered may lead the publishing institution to make statements that further inquiry will reveal to be untrue;
retractions are never helpful to the PR effort. Moreover, an incomplete
factual basis means that the narrative on which it is premised may be
inaccurate and thus unable either to educate its audience or provide
meaningful recommendations for institutional improvement. A report
that is rushed may be seen more as PR puffery than as credible selfreflection, which might alienate the public and make the effort appear
disingenuous.
The 9/11 Commission Report, which took some twenty months to
compile and was delivered nearly three years after the attacks, demonstrates the value of a comprehensive approach. By giving itself enough
time to authoritatively deliver a compelling and accurate narrative of
the day’s events, the 9/11 Commission enhanced the credibility and
impact of its report. Conversely, the Roberts Commission delivered its
report less than two months after Pearl Harbor; consequently, its conclusions were deemed “hasty, inconclusive, and incomplete” by Congress’s Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor
Attack.106
That being said, an investigative and reporting process that takes
too long might likewise be self-defeating. A prolonged period of
silence following an event may be perceived as lack of concern with
regard to institutional responsibility for the crisis and its consequences;
it may also create a space for entities potentially adverse to the institution to take control of the narrative for their own purposes.107 Advice
from Warren Buffett is instructive in this space: “First, state clearly that
you do not know all the facts. Then promptly state the facts you do
know. One’s objective should be to get it right, get it quick, get it out,
and get it over. You see, your problem won’t improve with age.”108
Rutgers University experienced this problem firsthand with the
report it commissioned to evaluate the university’s response to Hurri105. Id.; see also KING & SPALDING, supra note 103.
106. INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK – REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,, U.S. Congress (1946) at 3 (“It
is extremely unfortunate that the Roberts Commission report was so hasty, inconclusive,
and incomplete. Some witnesses were examined under oath; others were not. Much testimony was not even recorded.”).
107. Excessive delay might also cause consternation for the families of those
affected by the crisis who wish to find closure. A report, even though it may not address
all of the questions that persons affected by the crisis might have, may at least help to
address some. It is likely that those affected—including, depending on the facts, the
public and employees—will appreciate the organization’s effort to publish a report to
answer these open questions.
108. Augustine, supra note 15, at 21.
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cane Sandy.109 Although Rutgers eventually released a redacted version of the report to the general public, administration officials stalled
for six months in what many media outlets condemned as an attempt to
keep the report secret.110 As a result, the report faced an uphill battle
from inception for credibility in the community.111 Community members assumed that, because Rutgers was reluctant to release the report,
they must have had something to hide.112
4. How Much Access?
The question of how much access to accord a commissioned investigative team is also one that is fraught with tension. Too much access
may compromise the institutional position both in terms of the immediate crisis and in areas that are arguably beyond its scope (which makes
consideration of this factor often coextensive with considerations of the
appropriate parameters of an investigation). On the other hand, too
little access may weaken the report, leaving it vulnerable to criticisms
that the institution is unwilling to share crucial facts and thus address
the crisis in a meaningful way, that the results are misleading by omission, and that the final product is unable to effect vital institutional
change.
Ultimately, the tension should typically be resolved in favor of
according greater access, provided there are no compelling legal considerations for limiting external team members’ access to what is necessary for evaluating the situation at hand. The historical record
demonstrates ways in which lack of access can leave a report significantly weakened and open to attack. The Columbine Report, for example, was limited in its ability to clarify events and prevent future similar
recurrences by investigators’ lack of access to information from the
sheriff’s office.113 The reliability of the Freeh Report was undermined
by the fact that critical witnesses were never interviewed.114 As discussed, the initial attempt to create an effective response to the events
of 9/11 was similarly compromised by lack of access to classified documents, resulting in a report that was unable to withstand popular criticism and made the entire endeavor worse than useless.115
109. RUTGERS UNIVERSITY, EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS TASK FORCE REPORT: HURRISANDY (2012).
110. See Chase Brush, Rutgers Finally Releases Its Hurricane Sandy Task Force Report,
MUCKGERS (Nov. 26, 2013), http://www.muckgers.com/2013/11/rutgers-finally-releasesits-hurricane-sandy-task-force-report/.
111. See id. (referring to the six-request process of obtaining the report as “pulling
teeth”).
112. Id.
113. See COLUMBINE REPORT, supra note 51, at ix.
114. See KING & SPALDING, supra note 103, at 14 (quoting former Attorney General
Thornburgh: “Although the Freeh Report’s description of its interview process sounds
impressive . . . [it] fails to acknowledge that, as a result of the above-described limitations,
it lacked access to the most critical witnesses, which severely limits the reliability and usefulness of the Report.”).
115. Fenster, supra note 39, at 1270 (“It tried, but failed, to obtain sensitive information from the Executive Branch, which refused some congressional requests for documents. Worse, the White House refused to declassify some documents it did disclose,
CANE
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The question of access is inextricably intertwined with the question
of investigative independence discussed earlier in Section III.A.1 of this
Article. Lack of access may indicate either that the investigative team
has been co-opted by the commissioning institution or that the latter is
unwilling to follow through on the commitment to truth-finding
implied by the decision to pursue the mechanism in the first place. An
institution wants to avoid charges of conflicts and the appearance that it
is somehow attempting to thwart efforts to uncover the truth. The
experience of the second 9/11 Commission is instructive of both this
danger and its accompanying potential to strengthen the process. The
commission’s reported attempts and initial failures to gain access to
sensitive documents threatened the Bush administration with accusations of intractability. However, the administration’s subsequent decision to deal with the situation by providing the commission with the
contested information both illustrated its commitment to public access
and truth and emphasized the independence of the commission from
the administration.116
Despite the ideal of broad, wide-ranging access, it is more likely
than not that access will be limited. Addressing such limitations is
essential to maintain the credibility of the report. Where access is limited, the report should admit the limited access and approach its factfinding and conclusions with humility.117 It is also best to explain the
reasons behind the restrictions. Providing the public with a clear
understanding of why access was limited and explaining the legitimacy
of such limitation may preempt alternate narratives by adverse parties
to the effect that access was limited due to the recalcitrance of the institution, a conclusion which, if widely accepted, has the potential to compromise the entire effect of the report. For example, it may be beyond
the institution’s power to compel certain individuals to cooperate with
the work of the investigative team. The extent to which employees and
affiliated individuals are required to cooperate will vary depending on
the facts, the state, and the employer. Ensuring that the public audience of the final report understands this will both illuminate the inherent parameters of the report and protect the commissioning institution
from accusations of hobbling the team’s truth-finding efforts.
While pragmatic considerations counsel limited access in some
instances, legal considerations are often primary. The need to understand how the law limits certain disclosures, and why, re-emphasizes the
importance of including a lawyer on the team. Privacy and confidentiwhich resulted in a heavily redacted final report that failed to satisfy public demand for
an open investigation into the attacks. The report itself acknowledged the limitations of
the Joint Inquiry’s investigation and viewed an independent commission as a necessary
corrective measure.”).
116. See Falkenrath, supra note 40, at 173–75.
117. See POWERS REPORT, supra note 53, at 2 (“We have had only limited access to
certain workpapers of Arthur Andersen LLP (‘Andersen’), Enron’s outside auditors, and
no access to materials in the possession of the Fastow partnerships or their limited partners. Information from these sources could affect our conclusions.”).
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ality issues are often codified by statute, and their violation may expose
the commissioning entity to further legal liability.
More prominent in the mind of most institutions is the extent to
which allowing greater access can undermine their legal positioning visà-vis the inevitable lawsuits that follow a crisis by providing more evidentiary fodder to plaintiffs’ lawyers. A lawyer will be aware of the way in
which disclosing certain information will impact pending and
threatened litigation. But here, as in other areas, it is necessary that
one not let the legal crisis consume the (typically more important) institutional and public relations crises. The company should be mindful
that a strategy that over-privileges its legal positioning at the expense of
the public relations and institutional crises could lead to greater grief.
The experience of experts familiar with this dilemma has been, as
stated by one expert, that “it is preferable to err on the side of overdisclosure, even at the risk of harming one’s legal position.”118 Feeney
and Brown articulate why this is true:
[A] company’s desire to assert privileges in subsequent proceedings must be balanced against any public statements the company
has made regarding its investigation. For example, if the company
has publicly accepted responsibility for an accident and has promised to conduct a transparent investigation, it generally should not
later try to prevent the disclosure of its investigation’s finding by
invoking privilege. Such an attempt may appear inconsistent,
which could have negative ramifications for the company in the
public and courtroom arenas.119

A stated commitment to wide access and transparency, and continued fidelity to that position, is often met with public approbation and
makes it more likely that the final report will be positively received.
The report published by Shell following its crisis, for example, was
greeted with commendation for its pledge to make broad disclosures
despite the possible consequences to the company of doing so.120
B. Best Practices for Framing a Written Report
The overarching goal of this Article is to provide practical guidance to those institutions considering the use of a commissioned public report in their crisis management strategy. Accordingly, this Section
will offer aid in that area, gleaned from years of experience in the field
and close analysis of the efficacy of existing sample reports as crisis
response tools. The written report is significant because it encompasses
the conclusions of the investigative commission’s findings in tangible
form, and what the public will use to formulate an opinion about corporate responsibility for, and adequacy of response to, the crisis. It is
118. Augustine, supra note 15, at 21.
119. Feeney & Brown, supra note 85, at 32.
120. Diana Bentley, Crisis Management, 4 IN-HOUSE PERSP. 9, 10 (2008) (discussing
the Shell Crisis and praising the decision to make full disclosure, despite the
consequences).
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therefore important that the issuing commission construct a narrative
in accord with the following recommendations.
1. Provide a Detailed and Accurate Description of the Facts
The facts are the starting point of any commissioned public report.
Understanding exactly what the crisis was is key, as a report which does
not understand its subject cannot hope to make any sort of meaningful
contribution to an understanding of what went wrong and what ought
to be done in the future to prevent its recurrence. This was one of the
greatest strengths of the 9/11 Commission Report121—it presented a
comprehensive account of the attacks in a way that was accessible to the
public, such that its recommendations, when they were presented, were
put in context. Without understanding the facts, it is impossible to critically evaluate the ability of proposed changes to remedy institutional
weaknesses—understanding the facts is crucial to solving problems and
preventing future crisis.122 Even if the recommendations of the
report’s authors are not embraced, a well-written fact section can provide the basis for others to make positive recommendations.123
In terms of legal positioning, providing a thorough account of the
events leading up to the subject crisis also indicates openness and selfreflection. This may make affected parties less likely to sue, depending
on their motives for doing so, and could lead a jury to be more amenable to the defendant’s version of events. The Tylenol recall remains the
paradigm of a corporation’s response to a complicated consumer product problem. Johnson & Johnson was plagued in October 1982 by the
contamination of Tylenol, a core headache medicine of the company,
by “malevolent person or persons” unknown.124 Commentators noted
the company’s complete candor during the crisis and credited that
openness for helping to resolve its PR crisis and save its public
image.125 Consideration of this factor also counsels attention to narrative style. The facts section should be straight-forward and easy to
understand:
[O]ne should never—repeat never!—give technical explanations
or impersonal statistics to assuage the fears of consumers. Technical information is more likely than not to be perceived as gobbledygook, a sure sign that one is engaged in hiding the truth, and
121. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 38, at 35–46.
122. Feeney & Brown, supra note 85, at 32 (“Investigation facilitates prevention;
that is, many crises are investigated so the company can determine their root causes and
prevent a recurrence. The company may also need to determine the cause of an incident
or crisis to defend the company against potential civil and criminal litigation.”).
123. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 40, at 25–29 (providing his own recommendations
based off the 9/11 Commission Report’s factual narrative).
124. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, Case Study: The Johnson & Johnson Tylenol Crisis,
available at http://www.ou.edu/deptcomm/dodjcc/groups/02C2/Johnson%20&%20
Johnson.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2015).
125. MITROFF & ANAGNOS, supra note 10, at 17, 20 (“[A]s many organizations have
sadly found out, it is not only comparatively easy to handle a situation when one is the
victim, but it is also extremely easy to go quickly from being a victim to being a villain.”).
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indeed has truth to hide. Thus it serves only to further the
crisis.126

However, issues of privilege and the other issues that a company
could face as a result of the publication of such narratives means that
lawyers should always be consulted to assist in determining the risks of
publication and balancing them against the corresponding benefits. Of
course, skilled lawyers will likely be able to aid the commissioning entity
in publishing a narrative that successfully achieves that balance.
Providing an authoritative narrative of the certain set of circumstances that constitute the crisis is also important per se. An effectivelyconstructed facts section may retake control of the story from those
who have adopted it for their own uses—the media, to sell newspapers;
competitors, to gain leverage vis-à-vis the affected entity, for example. A
comprehensive narrative in which people can place their faith as the
official account of the crisis chronology may also provide the opportunity for public catharsis. Indeed, the narrative may be the raison d’être of
the report. The 9/11 Commission Report, for example, was born out
of the public need to understand what had occurred on September 11,
2001.127
2. Focus on Lines of Communication in Place During Crisis
Crucial to the construction of an effective narrative is the identification of who knew what and when. In other words, the narrative
should describe the extent and the nature of the lines of communication that were in place during the crisis. This should not be a fingerpointing exercise;128 rather, the point is to make an inquiry into the
lines of communication and access to information.129 Such a recommendation is deserving of its own section because improving communication will almost always also be a recommendation of any crisis report.
Breakdowns in communication are not only often largely to blame for a
crisis being allowed to occur in the first place, but also for inadequacies
in the post-crisis response that serve to exacerbate, and are properly
considered part of, the overall crisis.
Properly handling the communication inquiry is a delicate matter,
as it can quickly devolve into a scapegoating exercise. The Freeh
Report, for example, focused on specific individuals who knew of the
126. Id. at 86.
127. See Falkenrath, supra note 40, at 171–72; Fenster, supra note 39, at 1270–71
(“By September 2002, after the Joint Inquiry had completed its hearings but before it had
issued its final report, key Republican senators expressed their frustration with the Executive Branch’s interference in the Joint Inquiry and publicly announced their support for
an independent commission. At the same time, the President himself began to signal his
willingness to allow one to go forward. Victims’ families in particular acted as an effective
public voice and lobby in favor of a more thorough investigation.”).
128. MITROFF & ANAGNOS, supra note 10, at 42 (calling for “no-fault learning” in
crisis management). For more on the topic of identifying individual failings, see infra Part
III.B.5.
129. See, e.g., 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 38, at 35–46 (describing lines of
communication on 9/11).
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abuse, without delving deeper to discuss where the lines of communication had broken down, and why. That is, rather than focusing on the
structural limitations that allowed the abuse to occur, the report
appears to have been content to blame the lack of communication on
individual failings.130
In contrast, the Columbine Report addressed problems of communication at the institutional level, noting that emergency response
departments used radios that operated on different signals: “the resulting inability to communicate . . . proved a major problem at Columbine.”131 Rather than lay the blame with individual officers or
dispatchers for the communication disconnect that marred the Columbine response effort, the Report highlighted a systemic deficiency
which enabled the failure.132 Similarly, the Virginia Tech Report outlined steps by which communication between administrators and counseling centers might be facilitated.133 While the Report noted that
misconceptions by various school and police officials about federal and
state privacy laws were in part to blame, the Report addressed these
misconceptions by offering institutional solutions to prevent similar
future mistakes.134
3. Evaluate Control Mechanisms
A well-written report will focus on when various control mechanisms could have been enacted and identify how the incident could
have been prevented with existing systems and protocols. The purpose
of this section is not to make conclusions or recommendations, but to
determine which mechanisms could have, if properly enacted, prevented the incident. That is, did the boat float away because the rope
was too weak? Or did it float away because there was no rope at all?
Often, the institutional breakdowns that allow a crisis to occur are due
not to the lack of forethought surrounding their prevention, but rather
to a lack of enforcement.
The 9/11 Commission Report’s analysis of the events it considered
illustrated that there were operational opportunities to prevent the
attacks which were simply not utilized. Although protocols were in
place, they were not functioning at the level which hindsight revealed
to be optimal—for example, the commission was able to identify a
missed opportunity by the CIA to watch-list one of the attackers in January 2000, more than a year before the assault.135 The Gjørv Report,
too, explained that the attack on the government complex on “22 July
could have been prevented through effective implementation of
already adopted security measures.”136 Such examples are numerous,
130. See FREEH REPORT supra note 42, at 52, 67–69.
131. COLUMBINE REPORT, supra note 51, at 10–13, 46.
132. See id.
133. VIRGINIA TECH REPORT, supra note 41, at 2, 21, 25 (discussion of barriers to
communication).
134. See id.
135. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 38, at 35–56, 266.
136. GJøRV REPORT, supra note 45, at 11.
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confirming the importance of ensuring that control mechanisms are
not only considered, but also adequately implemented. The In Amenas
Report’s description of security capabilities prior to the attack and of
performance during the attack,137 the Freeh Report’s account of the
police listening in on a conversation between Sandusky and a victim’s
mother,138 and the Columbine Report’s account of the warning signs
all demonstrate this point.139
4. Identify Areas of Weakness
One of the greatest benefits promised by a commissioned public
report is to elucidate the fundamental institutional weaknesses that
allowed the crisis to take place, thus to prevent recurrence. How could
the tragedy have been prevented, beyond the more effective implementation of mechanisms already in place? What does that say about more
fundamental weaknesses?140 While it is often the case that ineffective
implementation of control mechanisms allows the circumstances for
crisis to converge, a lack of such controls in the first place may also
contribute primarily to the incident’s occurrence. At Columbine, for
example, the relevant players had followed their training; it was thus a
different type of weakness that the report recommended the institution
address.141
The 9/11 Commission identified four general areas of institutional
weakness in the federal systems it analyzed which are broad enough to
be generally applicable. First, it pointed out a weakness in imagination,
recommending that stakeholders recognize that future crises will not
mimic those of the past, and, therefore, that a flexible and imaginative
approach to risk-assessment must be instituted (“institutionalizing imagination”).142 Falkenrath rightly points out that this is “more of a slogan
than an argument: it sounds good but is an almost indecipherable muddle.”143 As difficult as it may be to implement in a concrete and meaningful way, however, it is nonetheless helpful in counseling a more
flexible approach to crisis planning and management. The Commission also recommended strengthening institutional policy, noting the
importance of clearly-defined and disseminated policies in guiding
organizational actors’ priorities;144 strengthening capabilities by assess137. IN AMENAS REPORT, supra note 3, at 55, 61.
138. FREEH REPORT, supra note 42, at 45–46.
139. COLUMBINE REPORT, supra note 51, at 19–22.
140. See, e.g., GJøRV REPORT, supra note 45, at 15–16 (gathering identified errors
and articulating areas of weakness such as “[t]he ability to acknowledge risk and learn
from exercises”); OKLAHOMA CITY BOMBING AFTER ACTION REPORT, supra note 50, at 38
(identifying issues, discussing them, and proposing recommendations).
141. COLUMBINE REPORT, supra note 51, at 60.
142. Id. at xiii (discussing, as a weakness, an inability to conceive of children committing such atrocities); id. at 96 (recommending regular planning sessions that will discuss “worst-case scenarios”); GJøRV REPORT, supra note 46, at 16 (identifying, as a
weakness, the inability to acknowledge the risk of various worst case scenarios).
143. Falkenrath, supra note 40, at 178.
144. See, e.g., 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 38, at 349 (“Al Qaeda and terrorism was just one more priority added to already-crowded agendas . . . .”); COLUMBINE
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ing the limitations existing structure creates;145 and management—
organizations need to ensure that those on the ground have correct
instructions and that there is proper oversight, communication, and
understanding of roles within the organizations.146 Inadequate communication was the area of weakness most cited by the commission in
the “management” category, particularly the lack of communication
among various self-contained entities.147
5. Identify the Institutional Failure Behind the Individual Failures
An effective report will address the institutional crisis in a way that
offers guidance to strengthen the institution as a whole going forward.
This recognizes that structural weaknesses, more than individual moral
failings, are the most productive area of focus in post-crisis management. Finger-pointing and moral judgment may be a distraction from
the main purpose—that is, remediating and strengthening the institution with the structural capacity to make meaningful change. In this
regard the 9/11 Commission Report provides us with a positive example to emulate. By focusing on institutional structure and capabilities,
it allowed for a more candid assessment of where things went wrong.
Likewise, the Abu Ghraib report, where the circumstances lent themselves to finger-pointing perhaps more than most, also recognized that
REPORT, supra note 51, at x (“Law enforcement policy and training should emphasize that
the highest priority of law enforcement officers, after arriving at the scene of a crisis, is to
stop any ongoing assault.”).
145. See, e.g., ABU GHRAIB REPORT, supra note 47, at 56 (“[T]he current force structure for the [Military Police] is neither flexible enough to support the developing mission
nor can it provide for the sustained detainee operations envisioned for the future.”);
ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW BOARD’S BENGHAZI REPORT, supra note 44, at 4–5 (describing
security difficulties resulting from unclear shared responsibilities); COLUMBINE REPORT,
supra note 51, at x, xiii (noting that all law enforcement officers, whether designated as
SWAT or not, and all school employees should receive crisis training); IN AMENAS REPORT,
supra note 3, at 69–70 (discussing limited capabilities of private security to address threat
of terrorism, limited capabilities of Algerian military to address terrorism, and limited
capabilities of coordination due to lack of shared information.);VIRGINIA TECH REPORT,
supra note 41, at 31, 39, 74 (describing inability of school officials, mental health officials,
and police officials to assess dangers due to uncertainty in disclosure rules between school
officials, mental health officials, police officials, and gun sellers).
146. See e.g., 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 38, at 355–56 (explaining the
difficulties in piecing together all the information from the myriad sources of intelligence
without an oversight body); ABU GHRAIB REPORT, supra note 47, at 45 (pointing to the
unclear chain of command as a primary cause of the Abu Ghraib abuses); ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW BOARD’S BENGHAZI REPORT, supra note 44, at 6 (noting the importance of identifying “who, ultimately, [is] responsible and empowered to make decisions based on
policy and security considerations”); COLUMBINE REPORT, supra note 51, at 13 (difficulties
arising from it being unclear who was in charge); POSNER, supra note 40, at 9 (suggesting
that the 9/11 Commission’s findings suggest a weakness in management, rather than
capabilities).
147. See ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW BOARD’S BENGHAZI REPORT, supra note 44, at 5–6,
29, 35; see also COLUMBINE REPORT, supra note 51, at xi, 13, 62–63 (describing communication difficulties, including that the responders from different organizations were literally
operating on different bandwidths); FREEH REPORT, supra note 42, at 135–36; DEP’T OF
DEF., supra note 43, at 3 (“[A] gap exists in providing information to the right people.”);
VIRGINIA TECH REPORT, supra note 41, at 23, 53 (discussing difficulties in sharing mental
health and disciplinary data with authorities and before gun purchase).
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systemic issues, more than simply individual failures, allowed the crisis
to occur.148
As noted before, however, the Freeh Report is most instructive as
an example of what to avoid. Though the report listed institutional
weaknesses, its focus on the individual moral failings of the actors at the
center of the scandal149 ultimately dominated both the focus of the
report and the focus of the media coverage of the report. As a result,
the report (and, therefore, the crisis) remains a point of controversy;150
the report was not only ineffective in mitigating the crisis, but made it
worse.151 The lingering infamy of the Roberts Commission, which “has
been criticized for . . . placing too much blame on the field commanders in Hawaii; failing to adequately investigate intelligence regarding secret signals that might have prompted greater readiness had it
been shared with the Pearl Harbor commanders,”152 likewise failed in
its objectives by focusing on individual failings at the expense of larger
systemic issues. While the Mitchell Report tried to limit the controversy
by arguing against penalties for named players,153 such focus ultimately
148. See ABU GHRAIB REPORT, supra note 47, at 45 (pointing to an unclear chain of
command as a central weakness leading to the Abu Ghraib abuses: “[t]hese arrangements
had the damaging result that no single individual was responsible for overseeing operations at the prison”).
149. FREEH REPORT, supra note 42, at 52 (describing how the Penn State athletic
director never declared Sandusky, later revealed to be a child molester, a “persona non
grata” on campus, as he had a sports agent). This paragraph belies the scapegoating of
the report. The paragraph contrasts Spanier’s response to a sports agent on campus with
his response to Sandusky without exploring the institutional and structural pressures that
led to the reported moral failings of Spanier.
150. See generally KING & SPALDING, supra note 103.
151. The recent report stemming from the FIFA investigation into possible misconduct connected with the bid process to host the 2018 and 2022 World Cups is illustrative
of the way in which a report, if mishandled, can aggravate the institutional crisis. FIFA’s
chief investigator, Michael J. Garcia (a former U.S. Attorney), published his findings to
the soccer organization’s governing body in a 430-page report. The organization’s judge
decided that it would be best not to publish the report in its entirety, choosing rather to
publish a 42-page summary of the same which Mr. Garcia stated “contains numerous
materially-incomplete and erroneous representations of the facts and conclusions
detailed in the Investigatory Chamber’s Report.” Citing frustration with the way in which
the findings of the report were treated, Mr. Garcia then resigned in protest. It is understood that the report revealed institutional weaknesses within the FIFA executive committee, including a “culture of entitlement,” an “attitude that the rules don’t apply to the
executive committee,” and “a failure to properly consider their obligations to the organization.” Following Mr. Garcia’s resignation, FIFA agreed to a limited publication of the
report. See Joshua Robinson & Matthew Futterman, FIFA World Cup Investigation Sparks
Dispute, WALL ST. J (Nov. 13, 2014, 9:22 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/fifa-world-cupinvestigation-sparks-internal-dispute-1415873984; Joshua Robinson, FIFA Investigator
Michael Garcia Resigns in Protest, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 17, 2014, 3:48 PM), http://www.wsj.
com/articles/fifa-investigator-michael-garcia-resigns-in-protest-1418832459; Joshua
Robinson, FIFA Agrees to a Limited Publication of Hosting Rights Report, WALL ST. J (Dec. 19,
2014, 3:07 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/fifa-agrees-to-limited-publication-of-hosting
-rights-report-1419001271.
152. See Cole, supra note 26, at 12–13.
153. MITCHELL REPORT, supra note 57, at 33 (arguing against penalties on named
players).
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meant that the names were the story, rather than the more generally
applicable conclusions and recommendations of the report.
Perhaps another way to conceptualize the same point is to keep in
mind that no crisis ever has a single cause.154 Focusing on individuals
as the source of crisis makes the final product ineffective in achieving its
goal of resolving the three crises because it paints an overly-specific picture of the situation, a picture that is inaccurate by its exclusion of
equal or more viable elements. Focusing on the institutional crisis,
however, necessarily requires taking a birds’ eye view of the situation
and putting each circumstance in its proper place in the narrative.
6. Make Reasonable and Proportional Recommendations
Arguably the most important part of a report is the recommendations section, which identifies institutional weaknesses in order to
advise ways in which to make the entity stronger in the future. These
recommendations should be tied to specific areas of weakness and, if
possible, to the existing organizational controls structure to make their
implementation more manageable and accordingly more likely. Vague
or poorly-defined recommendations obviously compromise the possibility of their implementation. The 9/11 Commission Report is illustrative in this regard—its failure to give adequate attention to the realities
of post-9/11 intelligence and to specifically describe the problems its
reorganization proposal sought to solve arguably compromised its
effectiveness.155
Recommendations must also confront the tension between offering practical or ideal recommendations. Ideal recommendations tend
to be vague. Moreover, while it is tempting to recommend vast and
sweeping changes, such changes are more costly and less likely to be
implemented by the subject institution. This is a variant on the familiar
maxim that “the perfect is the enemy of the good”—go too far, and one
might not get anywhere at all. Therefore, it is important that recommendations be written with an acknowledgment of practical limitations.
The Benghazi Report, for example, pragmatically observed that the
“total elimination of risk is a non-starter for U.S. Diplomacy.”156 The 9/
11 Commission Report was criticized for its failure to similarly understand the actualities of the intelligence landscape.157 According to critics, this lack of adequate comprehension by its authors made the
154. See MITROFF & ANAGNOS, supra note 10, at 133 (stressing the importance of
“treating the big picture”).
155. See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 38, at 344; see also Falkenrath, supra
note 40, at 176, 182–83, 187.
156. ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW BOARD’S BENGHAZI REPORT, supra note 44, at 2; see also
COLUMBINE REPORT, supra note 51, at 118–21 (deciding against recommending technology-based security devices for all schools, noting “these technologies can be very expensive to implement” and are not particularly effective).
157. See Falkenrath, supra note 40, at 176 (criticizing the 9/11 Report for inadequately addressing the pressures and realities of intelligence and for not considering post9/11 reforms).
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recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Report both vague and
idealistic:
Anybody who bothers to read them, which tends to be a remarkably few people who are commenting on the report, realizes that
you can’t solve problems when you don’t know what you are saying in terms of staff, costs, operating systems, and other details.
This is critical because, among other things, when you look
through that report, you see vague recommendations about getting rid of the causes of terrorism or about dealing with issues like
Islamic extremism or improving the quality of the CIA, which are
among the most important recommendations you could make.
And then you suddenly realize that this is a paragraph of generalities or cliches with absolutely no operating content at all.158

In order to avoid these pitfalls, we suggest that a hallmark of an
effective commissioned public report is one that makes concrete and
practical recommendations that focus on flexibility and institutional
competence in the face of a crisis.159 A focus on implementation
should maintain this focus—ensuring that the recommendation is
framed to address a specific weakness and is practical and concrete
enough to allow for feasible implementation will make such implementation, and thus positive institutional changes, more likely to occur.160
The report on the exposure of NSA spying practices by the President’s
Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies is
noteworthy in this regard. The report laid out forty-six clear, thoughtful recommendations for the future of American intelligence gathering,161 but it drew some criticism from commentators who found that
the report valued realistic goals above substantive, meaningful
reform.162
IV. BUILDING

THE

ARK

BEFORE THE

FLOOD

An effective commissioned public report that can adequately
address the institutional crisis, which should be its top priority, will recommend structural changes that may prevent the recurrence of the
weaknesses that led to the crisis spurring the report. Reports should
therefore range beyond consideration of the specific facts that gener158. Brad D. Gwertzman, Cordesman: 9/11 Commission Report Lacks Specifics, COUNCIL
FOREIGN RELATIONS (Aug. 3, 2004), http://www.cfr.org/911-impact/cordesman-911commission-report-lacks-specifics/p7229.
159. See, e.g., 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 38, at 369; GJøRV REPORT, supra
note 45, at 24.
160. See, e.g., 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 38, at 423.
161. PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GRP. ON INTELLIGENCE AND COMMC’NS TECHS., LIBERTY AND
SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD 86–258 (2013).
162. See John Cassidy, Inside the White House N.S.A. Report: The Good and the Bad, NEW
YORKER (Dec. 19, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/johncassidy/2013/
12/nsa-report-white-house-the-good-and-the-bad.html (“I have some doubts about
whether the report is as radical as these reactions might suggest. Ultimately, it is more
about preserving the essentials of the current system, and making them more palatable
rather than knocking them down.”).
ON
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ated the immediate crisis in order to focus on common areas of crisis
management in need of improvement.
A. “Institutionalizing Imagination”
A commissioned public report that focuses only on how the immediately-past catastrophe could have been prevented in a parallel universe may be ineffective in preventing future crises, thus failing to
address in large part the paramount institutional crisis. Although the
criticism163 of 9/11 recommendations in this area is fair—how, exactly,
is imagination “institutionalized?”—recognition thereof should not
lead to dismissiveness of the importance of imagination in crisis management. The Statoil Report, for example, recognized that part of the
reason the facility’s security was inadequate to repel the attack was that
neither the company nor its joint venture partners “conceived of a scenario where a large force of armed attackers reached the facility.”164
So as not to fall into the same pitfalls earlier identified in this Article and vaguely suggest an idealistic change without also proposing
methods for its implementation—how, precisely, does one go about
“institutionalizing imagination?”—we recommend that an institution
implement a risk assessment and identification system that can be sensitive to certain warning signs that indicate potential trouble. Red team
analysis has been used to some effect, and may be employed by various
entities to gauge particular areas of institutional weakness.165 Organizations can identify past indicators of future trouble and train personnel to recognize warning signs that indicate the potential for both
imagined and imaginable crisis.166 They can implement systems to
monitor these identified telltale indicators—the proverbial death of a
canary in a coal mine—so that new threats can be quickly recognized
and addressed.167
163. Falkenrath, supra note 40, at 178 (claiming that institutionalizing imagination
is “more of a slogan than an argument: it sounds good but is an almost indecipherable
muddle”).
164. Publication of the Investigation Report on the In Amenas Terrorist Attack, supra note
62.
165. An article on U.S. Marine Corps red teams explains the concept, “A red team
may play the devil’s advocate or Napoleon’s corporal . . . . The general idea of red teaming can be described as a bright light we shine on ourselves to expose areas where we can
improve effectiveness. This light starts out white for everyone under the banner of red
teaming, but it goes through the prism of the particular organization and takes many
different forms in its application. . . . Sandia National Laboratories uses teams that
attempt malicious entry in both the physical and cyber world, while the intelligence community has teams that speculate about alternative futures and write articles as if they were
despotic world leaders.” Lt. Col. Brendan Mulvaney, Red Teams: Strengthening Through
Challenge, MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, July 2012, at 63, available at http://www.hqmc.marines
.mil/Portals/138/Docs/PL/PLU/Mulvaney.pdf. See also 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 38, at 347.
166. Id.; DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 43, at 26–28 (describing the need for training
programs so that the warning signs are recognizable).
167. See, e.g., 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 38, at 347; ACCOUNTABILITY
REVIEW BOARD’S BENGHAZI REPORT, supra note 44, at 9 (noting that “tripwires” should be
treated as “essential trigger mechanisms for serious risk management decisions and
actions”).
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B. Improving Management and Structure: Communication Is the Key
Over and again, failures in communication have been identified
both as a cause and an aggravating structure of crisis. In order to confront the manifold issues that may result from a breakdown in communication, structure—lines of communication—should be clearly
defined and familiar.168 It is crucial that there be interoperability
between various systems and organizations, and that all relevant entities
have access to—and use—a centralized data pool.169
The proper establishment of a communication system adequate to
the task of responding and preventing crisis requires that a balance be
struck between centralization and independence. Centralized data is
more efficient but also more subject to spreading error—flawed data
used by all respondents means that all act based on flawed information.
At the same time, too much independence in terms of the acquisition
of data makes it more likely that different persons will operate on parallel tracks and fail to communicate with each other to resolve a situation
through common efforts. We propose that an effective communication
structure will centralize the data and information, and establish the
central command structure, but will keep independence in the analysis
of the data.170 It is important in this regard not to conflate the need
168. See, e.g., COLUMBINE REPORT, supra note 51, at 86–89 (discussing the unclear
role of School Resource Officers as a major weakness and recommending the position’s
role be clarified); VIRGINIA TECH REPORT, supra note 41, at 131 (discussing the lack of
clarity regarding the management of the Family Assistance Center as a weakness, and
recommending that the structure be clarified).
169. See, e.g., COLUMBINE REPORT, supra note 51, at xvi, 69, 73–74, 90, 108 (discussing the weakness of poor communication interoperability and recommending improved
interoperability) (discussing the problem of the lack of a centralized pool of data and the
lack of sharing and recommending the creation of such a data pool and the sharing of
information); FREEH REPORT, supra note 42, at 135–36 (recommending that the board be
briefed about a number of issues, including “triggers” such as unusual severance packages); VIRGINIA TECH REPORT, supra note 41, at 54 (recommending required reporting so
as to create a centralized, accessible pool of data). Interoperability has been defined as
“the extent to which systems and devices can exchange data, and interpret that shared
data. For two systems to be interoperable, they must be able to exchange data and subsequently present that data such that it can be understood by a user.” What is Interoperability?, HEALTHCARE INFO. & MGMT. SYS. SOC’Y, http://www.himss.org/library/
interoperability-standards/what-is (last visited Feb. 28, 2015). See also 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 38, at 387, 416–19 (recommending a comprehensive screening system
across U.S. Borders, transportations systems, and other vital facilities; describing the
importance of information sharing generally); COLUMBINE REPORT, supra note 51, at 82,
108–09 (describing the need for communications systems among emergency responde rs
to be “interoperable”; calling for the sharing of information about potentially violent individuals across school districts); GJøRV REPORT, supra note 45, at 21 (recommending “more
sophisticated use” of the information and communications technology to check threats
against a centralized database and coordinate security actions); DEP’T OF DEF., supra note
43, at 30 (recommending the creation of a common force protection threat reporting
system across the Department of Defense).
170. See RICHARD A. POSNER, UNCERTAIN SHIELD: THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM IN
THE THROES OF REFORM 60–62 (2006) (calling for competition and decentralization
among intelligence agencies); POSNER, supra note 40 (criticizing the recommendations of
the 9/11 Commission that would reorganize the intelligence community under a national
intelligence director).
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for centralized data with the centralization of various properly-independent functions.171 Coordination among multiple entities requires a
unified framework of command, but this need not go as far as
centralization.172
In determining the most effective communication structure, the
architect must consider the relative benefits and costs of unification
and independence. As one scholar has articulated this balance,
Unification may encourage coordination across agencies and
committees and reduce resources devoted to maintaining duplicative structures, among other benefits. Unification can, however,
have costs as well: for example, destroying needed safeguards and
eliminating beneficial agency or committee competition. Finding
a desirable and politically feasible balance between unification
and redundancy is a difficult task, and a pressing one.173

Each and every system, however, requires the establishment of
proper priorities and their dissemination through clear and defined
policies and procedures.174
C. Improving Institutional Culture
As a general matter, setting the right organizational tone will go far
in mitigating the risk of crisis. A culture in which operatives are unable
or unwilling to question superiors, raise concerns through proper channels, and understand risk-prevention as an individual responsibility will
likely lead to an organization unable to perceive, let alone address, risks
before a crisis hits. An institution’s leaders are expected to establish
171. See POSNER, supra note 40, at 43 (“Efforts to centralize the intelligence function
are less likely to improve data sharing than to lengthen the time that it takes for intelligence analyses to reach the President, reduce diversity and competition in the gathering
and analyses of intelligence data, limit the spectrum of threats given serious consideration, and deprive the President of a range of alternative interpretations of ambiguous and
incomplete data to consider[.]”); id. at 152–53 (“The 9/11 Commission blamed the failure to anticipate the 9/11 attacks mainly on inadequate sharing of intelligence among
the different intelligence agencies and thought a more centralized intelligence structure
an indispensable part of the cure. But the cure may not fit the disease.”).
172. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, COUNTERING TERRORISM: BLURRED FOCUS, HALTING STEPS 36 (2007) (calling for the Director of National Intelligence to serve as a coordinator and overall supervisor, rather than as the senior intelligence adviser); POSNER, supra
note 40, at 148 (“Coordination of intelligence agencies is an imperative; centralization
may not be.”); 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 38, at 397 (recommending a nationwide adoption of the Incident Command System, which unifies command procedures
across multiple jurisdictions); COLUMBINE REPORT, supra note 51, at 79 (describing the
need for the advance establishment of an incident command system to coordinate diverse
public parties in the event of a crisis).
173. Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and
Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1655, 1657 (2006). See also, COLUMBINE REPORT, supra note 51, at 114 (discussing the need for a district-wide plan that is
also uniquely tailored to each school); FREEH REPORT, supra note 42, at 37, 131 (recommending increased centralization of oversight but also recommending splitting human
resources department from finance and business departments).
174. See ABU GHRAIB REPORT, supra note 47, at 92 (stressing the importance defining policy and priorities); COLUMBINE REPORT, supra note 51, at 12, 73–78.
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and maintain an integrated culture of safety,175 an inclusive and trustbased organizational culture where risks are addressed as warning signs
arise. Training176 and the awareness of potential threats is essential to
maintain the flexibility that is crucial to address previously-unimagined
risks.177 “Crisis management is not an extra to be added on. It needs to
be something that an organization is.”178
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has spent considerable time discussing the three-inone paradigm of every crisis, and inevitable inherent tension between
them. Are these three micro-crises created equal? Where it seems that
a choice must be made, does an effectively commissioned public report
respond to the institutional, legal, or public relations crisis?
We suggest that an effectively commissioned public report will err
on the side of the institutional crisis. Focusing on the institutional crisis
will often address the legal and public relations crises as well, while
focusing on the legal and public relations crises often comes at the
expense of the institutional crisis—the crisis most crucial for preventing
catastrophic recurrence.
A brief survey of the most successful commissioned public reports
emphasizes a focus on a few core components. These include a
detailed description of the facts to help assess the complexities of the
situation, give the relevant decision-makers the tools needed to address
the instant crisis and prevent future ones, provide the public the
answers they seek, and help to demonstrate an institutional commitment to honesty and openness. Additionally, effective reports that
focus on institutional weaknesses rather than on individual scapegoats
are better for the institution; though the public may bay for blood, taking the high road and declining to put all the blame on specific persons
is ultimately beneficial to the resolution of the public relations crisis.
This has the added benefit of mitigating potential legal crises by
decreasing the instance of specific admissions and thus the imposition
of vicarious liability in some instances.
By focusing on command structure, communication, culture, and
imagination, a successful report addresses the institutional issues as its
main priority, which facilitates flexibility and more effective responses
to future crises. This has obvious benefits for an institution, but also
175. See FREEH REPORT, supra note 42, at 129, 135 (recommending incorporating
the athletics program into the broader Penn State community) (recommending the
board members receive ethics training); VIRGINIA TECH REPORT, supra note 41, at 18–20
(recommending universal training with all parties discussing risk assessment).
176. See FREEH REPORT, supra note 42, at 135 (recommending ethics training for
members of the board); id. at 78 (discussing the need to practice and rehearse emergency
response); VIRGINIA TECH REPORT, supra note 41, at 18–20 (recommending universal
training).
177. See, e.g., id. at xvi, 95 (discussing the “culture of silence” problem at Columbine, whereby students felt pressure to stay silent about bullying) (recommending anonymous tip lines, as well as a campaign to counter bullying).
178. COOMBS, supra note 9, at 1.
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publicly demonstrates meaningful commitment to adapt to changed
circumstances to prevent recurrence.
This Article has demonstrated that sole focus on the public relations crisis is doomed to fail and will only aggravate the initiating catastrophe. The same situation may result from an exclusive focus on the
legal crisis. Maintaining a primary focus on the resolution of the institutional crisis, however, will be much more likely to organically resolve
the other two to the benefit of the affected institution.

